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In 2012, the National Credit Regulator (hereinafter the ‘NCR’), in its annual report, published 
a warning on the granting of unsecured credit, stating that the year saw an ‘unprecedented 
growth’ in the unsecured lending market. The aforementioned report noted an above average 
growth of 13,77 per cent over the course of the year.1 Furthermore, the report contended that 
although unsecured credit was a vital part of the South African credit market, it was not 
impervious to reckless lending and abusive practices.2 The NCR’s warnings proved true in 
August 2012 when, due to calls for increased wages, violence erupted at a Rustenburg 
platinum mine that lead to the death of thirty-four miners. It was subsequently revealed that 
high levels of debt as a result of unsecured credit was to be blamed for the ‘Marikana 
Massacre’.3   
Consequently, petitions were drafted for increased regulation, especially pertaining to 
unsecured credit and lending practices. In 2015, caps on interest and other fees applicable to 
various credit transactions were introduced to curb reckless lending.4 Although viewed by 
many as a safeguard for consumers, arguments have been put forward that the increased 
regulations and more stringent lending criteria have, in fact, reduced access to credit, 
especially to lower-income consumers.5  
This dissertation will analyse whether the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereinafter ‘the 
NCA’) and its regulations have impacted positively or negatively on consumers in relation to 
unsecured credit. Chapter 1 provides a contextual understanding for the dissertation, 
providing background to the research question, its rationale and methodology. To ensure the 
historical landscape of this research paper is understood, Chapter 2 examines the history of 
credit legislation in South Africa leading up to the implementation of the NCA and will explore 
the concept and history of unsecured credit. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of the 
                                                          
1 National Credit Regulator Annual Report (2012/13) available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR+ANNUAL+REPORT+2012-13.pdf, 
accessed on 11 March 2018 at 5. 
2 Ibid 5. Reckless lending, as provided by section 80 of the NCA, occurs when a credit provider fails to 
conduct an affordability assessment (as required by s81(2)) or the credit provider conducts such an 
assessment and enters into a credit agreement with the consumer, despite having information which 
indicates that the consumer did not comprehend or appreciate the risks, costs or obligations of said 
agreement; or information which indicates that the consumer will be become over-indebted as a result 
of entering into the agreement. 
3 M J Ellyne & B M Jourdan ‘Did the National Credit Act Facilitate a Credit Boom or Bust in South 
Africa?’ (May 2015) available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278618071_Did_the_National_Credit_Act_of_2005_Facilitat
e_a_Credit_Boom_and_Bust_In_South_Africa, accessed on 11 March 2018 at 4.  
4 GN 1080 of GG 39379, 6/11/2015; 106-111 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39379.pdf, accessed on 10 March 2018. 
5 National Credit Regulator Consumer Credit Market Report (2017) available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/CCMR/CCMR%202017Q4.pdf, accessed on 11 March 2018 at 4 in 
which statistics show that the rejection rate for credit applications was a staggering 51,39% in 2017.  
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present credit legislation by analysing legislation, statistics and case law. This analysis is 
necessary to ascertain strengths or weaknesses of the current credit regime. In order to 
identify recommendations that can be applied to our jurisdiction, Chapter 4 seeks to provide a 
comparative international perspective on existing credit legislation by comparing South Africa, 
India and the United Kingdom. Finally, Chapter 5 comprises of recommendations and a 


























Prior to the NCA, there existed inefficient consumer credit protection which consisted of the 
Usury Act 73 of 1968; the Credit Agreements Act 74 of 1980 and the Exemption Notices of 
1992 and 1999.6 The collapse of microlenders such as Saambou and Unibank, which charged 
exorbitant rates, prompted a consumer credit evaluation by the Department of Trade and 
Industry which highlighted various issues concerning regulation in the credit market7. These 
included, but were not limited to, a lack of comprehensive credit legislation; fragmented and 
outdated legislation; a lack of access to credit by consumers; high credit costs; and reckless 
lending by creditors.8 In 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry released a Policy 
Framework for Consumer Credit, which subsequently lead to the promulgation of the NCA in 
2005, and its regulations in 2006.9  
 
The purpose and objectives of the NCA is referenced in its preamble as well as section 3 and 
can be summarised as follows: to provide for a single, comprehensive system of credit; to 
promote and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers; and to ensure a fair, 
transparent and accessible market, especially to those who were previously disadvantaged.10 
In addition, the NCA attempts to establish a balance between the expansion of access to credit 
for consumers, and the protection of those consumers whilst simultaneously providing safety 
for creditors.11 Furthermore, by introducing the NCR and the National Consumer Tribunal 
(hereinafter the ‘NCT’), the NCA provides for a system of checks and balances, thereby 
ensuring consistency of treatment amongst consumers.12  
One of the forms of credit regulated by the NCA is that of unsecured credit or lending. 
Unsecured credit can be described as a loan which has no collateral mechanism, which means 
that the borrower does not provide any tangible assurance to satisfy the debt.13 Because 
                                                          
6 RP Goodwin-Groen & M Kelly-Louw ‘The National Credit Act and its Regulations in the Context of 
Access to Finance in South Africa’ (2006) available at http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Rep_NCA_AccesstoFinance_2006.pdf, accessed on 4 March 2018 at 12.  
7 M Kelly-Louw ‘Introduction to the National Credit Act’ ;15 Juta’s Business Law 147 (2007) 148. 
8 South Africa Department of Trade and Industry Credit Law Review: Setting the Scene (2004) 1.  
9 Kelly-Louw (note 7 above; 15).   
10 Ibid 149.   
11 NCA 34 of 2005 section 3(a). See also ss 60-66 which deals with consumer’s rights, including the 
right to information in a plain and understandable language; section 81(1) which requires a consumer 
to be truthful and honest when applying for credit; and section 97 which requires a consumer to 
disclose the location of his or her goods.  
12 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 3).  
13 Ibid 5. 
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lenders are undertaking more risks by granting unsecured credit,14 the fees and interest rates 
on unsecured loans are much higher, consequently proving a lucrative business opportunity 
for lenders.15 Despite this, unsecured credit is still increasingly popular amongst consumers 
due to its alluring factors. These factors include situations when consumers are denied access 
to formal financial assistance because of their poor credit profiles, and when consumers 
require money instantly.16 
 
Unsecured loans can likewise be attributed to business growth, consumption and wealth 
creation.17 This is because unsecured credit allows individuals to accrue assets and to make 
and develop businesses, which in turn, generates employment opportunities.18  
However, it can be argued that a failure to pay back excessive fees and interest can create a 
debt spiral which increases the vulnerability of consumers.19 The ‘Marikana massacre’ serves 
as evidence that indebtedness as a result of unsecured credit can cause political and social 
unrest.20 Furthermore, it has been suggested that recent amendments to the NCA and its 
regulations might exclude consumers from the secured credit market. In September 2017 the 
high rejection rate for credit applications was followed by an increase in the number of 
unsecured loans being issued in South Africa, which suggests that in attempting to protect 
consumers, stringent criteria introduced by the legislation may have had an adverse effect.21  
1.2 RATIONALE 
                                                          
14 ‘Lower-income’ or ‘low-income’ in the context of this paper refers generally to those who earn 
minimum wage (currently R20 per hour or R3500 per month) or lower resulting in an increased 
chance of defaulting on their loans, which is why they will be considered ‘high risk’ by lenders. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that lower-income consumers consist of varying races and 
professions, and consumers who are considered middle-class or wealthy can also apply for 
unsecured loans.  
15 R Rom The Impact of Unsecured Lending on the Financial Wellbeing of Consumers (unpublished 
MBA research project, University of Pretoria, 2013) 3.  
See also Virushka Kanniah Bank’s Adherence to the National Credit Act: Its effects on domestic 
indebtedness and fragility in South Africa (unpublished MMFI thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 
2015) 10.  
16 Rom (note 15 above; 11). 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 3. 
19 Ibid 11. 
20 Ibid 6. 
21 National Credit Regulator (note 5 above; 4) which shows unsecured loans increasing from R20,07 
billion to R22,29 billion. See also National Credit Regulator (Public Notice) The NCR Calls for Caution 
in the Granting of Unsecured Credit (2012) available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/articles/Advertorial%20NCR%20A4(Press).pdf, accessed on 
3 December 2018 in which a situation is illustrated whereby credit providers deny consumers secured 
loan products and instead offer them unsecured loans, thus ensuring lenders achieve a higher profit 
margin due to the increased maximum fees allowed on unsecured loans compared to secured loans. 
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The South African credit market has experienced a host of abuses,22 and the NCA thus seeks 
to ensure all parties conduct themselves responsibly.23 However, there has always been 
international and national debate surrounding the need for credit regulation and it is therefore 
necessary to examine the opinions of those who endorse stringent regulation, and the views 
of those who oppose it.  
Throughout history, advocates of regulation have put forward various arguments. For 
instance, it has been contended that credit legislation is needed to facilitate economic growth 
and investment within various economies.24 In South Africa, the NCA encourages growth by 
theoretically providing for increased access to credit, particularly to low income, previously 
disadvantaged groups.25 Furthermore, it is submitted that credit regulation is necessary to curb 
the excess of credit consumption, and that the NCA facilitates this objective by warding against 
predatory lending through its reckless lending provisions.26  
In addition, consumer protection frameworks, such as those aimed at the credit market, can 
be utilised to govern the relationship between users and suppliers of credit which facilitates 
transparency and fairness.27 Similarly, the NCA has been described as a ‘robust’ consumer 
protection framework due to its establishment of enforcement mechanisms for consumers 
(such as the NCR) which ensures remedy and redress.28 Furthermore, it has been contended 
that the Act’s stringent regulations safeguards the interests of both consumer and creditors 
and promotes the financial literacy of consumers to ensure they make informed decisions.29 
                                                          
22 South Africa National Treasury Discussion Paper Treating Consumers Fairly in the Financial 
Sector: A Draft Market Conduct Policy Framework for South Africa (2014) 6 available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 28 November 2018. Such abuses include high fees, reckless lending, illegal 
debt collection practices and incomprehensible information. 
23 P Jordaan The Credit Law of South Africa: a guide to consumers, credit users and credit grantors 
(2007) 2.  
24 Ibid 1 whereby the author refers to regulation as a ‘tool of economic growth’. 
25 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 6). See also NCA 34 of 2005 section 3(a) which states that one of 
the purposes of the NCA is to promote access to credit, especially those who were historically unable 
to access it. 
26 NCA 34 of 2005 ss 79-88. See also A R Adewale ‘Financial Regulation, Credit Consumption and 
Economic Growth-An Analysis of the National Credit Act in South Africa’ (2014) 30(2) The Journal of 
Applied Business Research available at 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/21894/Financial%20Regulation%2c%20Credit%20Cons
umptionAnd%20Economic%20Growth%20An%20Analysis%20Of%20The%20National%20Credit%20
Act%20In%20South%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed on 20 March 2018 at 370. 
27 National Credit Regulator Literature Review on the Impact of the National Credit Act has had on 
South Africa’s Credit Market: Final Report (2012) available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/jun13/NCR_NCA%20IMPACT%20LITERATURE%20REVIEW_FINAL%20REPORT_260612.
pdf, accessed on 12 March 2018 at 19.  
28 South African Human Rights Commission Human Rights Impact of Unsecured Lending and Debt 
Collection practices in South Africa (2017) 31. 
29 Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw (note 6 above; 47).  
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In addition, the NCA provides consumers with a degree of assurance when they are 
transacting with credit providers, as it aims to prevent risky behaviour by financial institutions 
by setting minimum standards that they must adhere to.30 
There is, however, a need to critically examine the balance between regulation and 
overregulation. Free market economy supporters contend that credit regulation obstructs 
market efficiency and impedes business activity, and are of the opinion that unencumbered 
markets will ensure that businesses, of their own accord, promote quality products and good 
services.31 The Free Market Foundation of Southern Africa reinforces this belief by arguing 
that over-regulation contributes to higher costs for consumers (especially the poorer 
population) in the form of higher prices, thereby impacting negatively on consumer growth.32  
Additionally, regulation has been labelled a ‘toothless tiger’ in that financial institutions, for fear 
of being accused of reckless lending, do not lend to lower-income markets.33 Consequently, 
lower-income consumers seek alternate credit options and are often faced with increased 
costs of credit. 
Although the NCA has been defined as a ‘rigorous regulatory environment’ it does possess 
many shortcomings.34 Apart from the content of the Act, which some authors regard as 
deviations from South African Law, the NCA has been continually criticised.35 It has been 
contended that consumers, for example, are often left vulnerable to exploitation by credit 
providers due to low levels of financial literacy, especially in the rural sectors.36 Some critics 
even argue that the NCA favours credit expansion over consumer protection and that 
increased credit expansion to lower-income groups means that both lenders and consumers 
are facing higher risks, which in turn, could impact financial stability.37 
Ultimately, it can be contended that the detailed provisions of the NCA and its many 
regulations are cognisant of the history of the credit market.38 However, in its attempts to 
improve and regulate access of credit to lower-income groups, the NCA may have contributed 
                                                          
30 NCA 34 of 2005 ss 74-77 which deals with credit marketing practices and ss 79-82; which contains 
measures aimed at preventing over-indebtedness and reckless lending.  
31 M Lipsky ‘Rulemaking as a tool of democracy’ 17 December 2014 at 2 available at 
http://www.demos.org/publication/rulemaking-tool-democracy, accessed on 28 May 2018 at 1.  
32 The Free Market Foundation of Southern Africa (Submission) Consumer Protection Bill (2006) 
available at http://www.freemarketfoundation.com/publications-view/submission-consumer-protection-
bill, accessed on 16 March 2018 at 6-7.  
33 M Kelly-Louw Future of Consumer Credit Regulation: Creative Approaches to Emerging Problems 
(2008) 92. 
34 National Credit Regulator (note 27 above; 20). 
35 J M Otto The National Credit Act Explained (2006) 5. 
36 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 5). 
37  Ibid 20.  




to higher levels of over-indebtedness,39 by facilitating the growth of unsecured credit.40 
Research has shown that due to NCA-imposed administration costs for lenders and caps on 
interest and fees for credit transactions, credit providers are reluctant to grant loans to higher 
risk, lower-income consumers.41 Consequently, consumers may be forced to make use of 
informal, unsecured forms of finance which attract higher costs.42  
Therefore, although the NCA provides consumer protection, it can be argued that the stringent 
criteria introduced by the Act and its regulations results in the unintended consequence of 
many consumers being denied access to finance.43 Consequently, with unsecured credit as 
their only alternative, they are faced with higher credit costs whilst lenders achieve higher 
profit margins.44 It can subsequently be reasoned that in an attempt to expand access to credit, 
the NCA may, in fact, have not achieved its other objectives. 
This dissertation will answer the main research question by analysing related sub-questions. 
Such questions include whether the regulation pertaining to unsecured credit improves 
financial accessibility in the market in accordance with the aims provided for in the NCA. This 
is necessary to determine whether consumers are assisted by the Act’s stringent regulation. 
It is therefore required that this research paper correspondingly examines the advantages of 
the current legislation in order to determine how consumers may benefit from its regime. In 
contrast, to determine the true scope of the NCA’s impact on consumers, the extent to which 
consumers are over-burdened by the current regulation also requires inspection. 
Notwithstanding the impact on consumers, this research paper also seeks to investigate 
whether the NCA and its regulations promote a satisfactory balance between consumer 
protection and access to credit. Furthermore, having regard to the advantages and drawbacks 
of the current credit regime, as well as credit legislation existing in other countries, this 
research paper also attempts to determine whether more, or less regulation, is needed to 
improve the current state of affairs. In analysing foreign credit legislation, this research paper 
will additionally provide various recommendations that may applied to address the 
shortcomings in South Africa’s current credit regime.  
                                                          
39 M Kelly-Louw ‘The prevention and alleviation of consumer over-indebtedness’ (2008) 20(2) SA 
Mercantile Law Journal 204.  
40 SR de Wet, I Botha & M Booyens ‘Measuring the effect of the National Credit Act on Indebtedness 
in South Africa’ (2015) 8(1) Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 99.  
41 Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw (note 6 above; 50) which provides an interview with Kuyasa, a non-
profit organisation who supplies micro-loans to poorer consumers who are excluded from the formal 
finance sector. In its interview, Kuyasa contends that increased regulation, such as the caps imposed 
on interest rates, will create a ‘hostile lending environment’ and force lenders to refuse loans to lower-
income consumers. 
42 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 226).  
43 Ibid 




This dissertation uses the qualitative approach of desktop research. This involves a review of 
case law, the relevant legislation, as amended, and academic writing including textbooks, 


























2.1 THE INFLUENCE OF CREDIT ON CONSUMERS 
Credit plays an important role in consumers’ lives, with procuring items on credit even being 
described as an ‘everyday occurrence’.45 Credit additionally allows consumers who cannot 
afford to pay cash for certain items, the chance to purchase these items through credit 
finance.46 Examples of these purchases include buying a vehicle or immovable property.47  
Credit can be described as a ‘trade practice according to which goods or services are supplied 
to a receiver and where the parties agree that the receiver is entitled to pay for the goods or 
services at a future date’.48 Furthermore, in exchange for allowing the receiver of the goods or 
services to settle payment later, the parties can agree that the borrower pay an additional 
amount called interest.49  
Delayed payment is an attractive characteristic of credit, allowing consumers to obtain 
resources without immediately reducing their bank balance. In South Africa, where many 
consumers are subjected to poverty, this factor is especially enticing.50 Although it can be 
contended that credit facilitates materialistic spending and contributes to needless debt, it has 
also been viewed as an aid for financial empowerment,51 and enables consumers to satisfy 
their immediate desires.52 However, the temptation of unabated consumption and increasing 
levels of debt has given rise to the need for some sort of regulation.53  
2.2 THE HISTORY OF CREDIT LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Consumer credit legislation, globally, is influenced by social, political and economic factors 
which all need to be borne in mind by drafters, as this necessitates a balance between the 
protection of consumers and the rights of lenders to yield a fair profit.54 In attempts to create 
this balance, South Africa implemented its first National Act, known as the Usury Act of 1926. 
This Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Limitation and Disclosure of Finance 
                                                          
45 M Kelly-Louw ‘Book Reviews’ (2009) 21 SA Mercantile Law Journal 286.  
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 N J Grove & J M Otto Basic principles of consumer credit law 2 ed (2002) 1.  
49 Ibid 
50 Adewale (note 26 above; 370). 
51 SR de Wet, I Botha & M Booyens (note 40 above; 84).  
52 D James ‘Deeper into a Hole? Borrowing and Lending in South Africa’ (2014) 55(9) Current 
Anthropology S17 
53 Adewale (note 26 above; 368). 
54 J Otto ‘The History of Consumer Credit legislation in South Africa’ (2010) 16(1) Fundamisa 259. 
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Charges Act 73 of 1968. The Usury Act 73 of 1986 thereafter considerably amended the 
Limitation and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act of 1968.55   
South Africa’s credit legislation, at that stage, consisted primarily of three main pieces of 
legislation namely: the Usury Act 73 of 1968 (the ‘Usury Act’-now repealed); the Credit 
Agreements Act 74 0f 1980 (the ‘Credit Agreements Act’) and the Exemption Notices of 1992 
and 1998 (the ‘Exemption Notices’).  
2.2.1 Usury Act 
The Usury Act covered loans of up to R300 000. The most noteworthy feature of the Usury 
Act was that it capped the interest rate of these loans to 26 per cent per annum (at the time of 
its repeal).56 Legislation which curbs excessive costs and interest rates are not a modern 
invention. In fact, the earliest forms of usury regulation can be traced back over 4000 years 
ago.57 In the South African context, the Usury Act, through its cap, had the unintentional effect 
of excluding lower income consumers from access to formal credit.58 This was owing to the 
fact that the lower interest rate meant lower profit margins for the lenders and therefore, served 
as no incentive for credit providers to loan money to higher risk consumers.59 The Usury Act 
however became outdated as it was promulgated in a time before credit cards and home 
loans.60 This came as a relief to many as the Usury Act was regarded as ‘one of the most 
complicated pieces of legislation enacted in South Africa’.61  
2.2.2 Credit Agreements Act 
While the Usury Act governed the financial features of credit agreements, the Credit 
Agreements Act was concerned with the regulation of the contractual features of credit 
agreements,62 such as the contents of said agreements, prohibited contractual terms, and 
requirements regarding deposits.63 Although the Usury Act and the Credit Agreements Act 
covered different aspects of credit agreements and were meant to supplement each other,64 
their scopes sometimes overlapped and this created interpretive difficulties.65 
                                                          
55 Otto (note 54 above; 261).  
56 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 201). 
57 M Kelly-Louw & P Stoop Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 7. For a brief 
discussion on the earliest forms of usury laws, see Scholtz et al Guide to the National Credit Act 
(2009) para 1.2.1. 
58 Kelly-Louw & Stoop (note 57 above; 8). 
59 Ibid 
60 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 201). 
61 Otto (note 54 above; 261). 
62 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 203). 
63 Otto (note 54 above; 266). 
64 Ibid 
65 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 203). 
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2.2.3 Exemption Notices 
The first Exemption Notice,66 which aimed at improving access to credit for lower-income 
consumers, was issued in 1992 and covered loans that were below the amount of R6000 and 
were exempted from provisions contained in the Usury Act.67 Furthermore, the interest rates 
which applied to these loans were uncapped, consequently resulting in the formation of a large 
but unregulated micro-lending industry,68 in terms of which lower-income consumers, with no 
security or collateral, could obtain finance, albeit at a higher cost.69  
In 1999, this Notice was repealed and replaced by the second Exemption Notice which applied 
to loans up to R10 000 and which were payable over 26 months.70 These loans, however, 
were exempted from both the Usury Act and from capped interest rates. Furthermore, 
microlenders were obliged to register with the Micro Finance Regulatory Council, providing 
regulatory oversight to lending bodies who were previously unregulated. 71   
2.2.4 Promulgation of the NCA 
Despite various legislative interventions in the credit market, levels of over- indebtedness and 
reckless lending increased for a multitude of reasons, inter alia because previously 
disadvantaged consumers, who were formerly denied access to finance, now had access to 
credit.72 However, many lower-income consumers were still excluded from accessing formal 
credit and were forced to source alternative loans through usurers73 and microlenders.74 
Owing to these factors, coupled with the collapse of Saambou and Unibank,75 it became 
apparent that the credit market in South Africa was dysfunctional.76 This prompted a review of 
                                                          
66 See Notice 73 in GN R3451 of GG 14498, 31/12/1992.  
67 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 202). 
68 Ibid. See also Leriba Consulting Limited ‘The risk of unsecured lending in South Africa’ (2013) 
Occasional research report available at http://www.leriba.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Leriba-
unsecured-lending-Report.pdf, accessed on 26 April 2018 at 2 in which concern is expressed over the 
exemption framework creating a ‘regulatory vacuum’ which caused widespread abusive practices.  
69 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 202).  
70 See Notice 713 of GG 20145, 1/06/1999, as amended by Notice 910 of GG 20307, 16/07/1999. 
See also Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 202). 
71 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 202). It should be noted that the MFRC no longer exists, however all 
credit providers, including microlenders, are obliged to register with the NCR. Furthermore, there exist 
other regulatory organisations, such as MicroFinance South Africa which seek to ensure ethical 
practices by its members (microlenders).  
72 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 204). See also Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw (note 6 above; 13) where 
it is submitted that inappropriate legislation, together with a minimal enforcement contributed to an 
‘unacceptable state of affairs’.  
73 Another, more colloquial term is for this type of lender is ‘loan shark’. 
74 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 204).  
75 Kelly-Louw (note 7 above; 148). 
76 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 204). 
16 
 
the Usury Act by the South African Law Reform Commission in 1994, and a need arose for 
the analysis of the existing legislation.77  
In response, the Department of Trade and Industry (the ‘DTI’) attempted to introduce various 
measures, such as those aimed at protecting micro-loans, but their attempts were futile.78 In 
2002, concerns were still mounting over the increasing levels of over-indebtedness and 
reckless lending by credit providers.79 Therefore, in that same year, the DTI set up a Technical 
Committee which was tasked with identifying weaknesses in the credit market. The 
weaknesses identified by the Technical Committee included inadequate provisions relating to 
disclosing the cost of credit; unsuitable debt collection provisions; and a drastically low Usury 
Act cap,80 which prevented low-income, higher risk consumers from obtaining formal credit. 81  
Once these weaknesses were identified, the DTI consolidated the findings of the Technical 
Committee with a Policy Framework for Consumer Credit in 2004, in which it was 
recommended by the Credit Law Committee that the Usury Act and the Credit Agreements 
Act should be repealed and replaced by a single, comprehensive statute and overseen by an 
independent, statutory regulatory body.82 The review subsequently resulted in the 
promulgation of the NCA in 2005 followed by the National Credit Regulations (the ‘regulations’) 
in 2006.83 The NCA has been hailed a ‘huge improvement’84  in regard to its predecessors and 
although simpler, has a wider field of application and regulates other areas besides interest 
rates (such as initiation fees and charges). Furthermore, the NCA regulates many forms of 
credit, including unsecured credit.  
2.3 THE HISTORY OF UNSECURED CREDIT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa experienced its first major growth in unsecured lending between the year 1980 
and the year 2000.85 In 1992 when the Exemption Notice exempted certain loans from the 
Usury Act with the aim of increasing access to credit and other financial services, various 
banks contended that the caps introduced by the Usury Act made it increasingly difficult to 
provide small loans to poorer consumers who wanted to gain entry to the formal financial 
                                                          
77 Kelly-Louw (note 7 above; 147).  
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
80 The lid that was placed on the costs that lenders were allowed to charge consumers was set at a 
maximum rate so low that lenders did not consider it viable to lend to consumers who had no 
collateral and who were more likely to default on their loans. 
81 Kelly-Louw (note 7 above; 148).  
82 Ibid 149. 
83 Ibid 
84 Otto (note 54 above; 261).  
85 Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 2).  
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sector.86 The exemption promoted the rapid growth of the micro-lending industry and by 1999, 
the number of micro-loans issued in the country totalled R15 billion.87 Due to the regulatory 
framework which existed at the time, the activities of micro-lenders were largely uninhibited, 
and as a result, abusive practices were extensive.88 Lenders opted to charge exorbitant 
interest rates whilst carrying little to no risk. In response to such abuses, the Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council (‘MFRC’) was established and all lenders providing loans in terms of the 
exemption notices had to be registered. 89 
In the year 2000, there existed three major lenders in the industry, namely, Saambou, Unifer 
and African Bank Limited. Collectively, these banks possessed micro-loan books estimated at 
over R14 billion, with the majority of these monies being collected through deductions from 
civil servants’ salaries, which was believed to be a ‘fail-safe’ strategy.90 However, the 
government opted to end this deduction mechanism,91 which resulted in the collapse of Unifer 
and the curatorship of Saambou.92 Following this crisis, the government, with the aim of 
refurbishing the entire credit regime, introduced the NCA and its regulations.93 The NCA 
promoted the development of the unsecured market by removing the exemption which had 
restricted unsecured lending in previous years.94 Furthermore, as an additional safety 
measure, lenders were required to register with the NCR and all lending was governed by the 
NCA itself.95 Some additional features of the NCA included different interest rate caps for 
various credit transactions.96   
However, the financial crisis in 2007 halted the development of unsecured credit and saw 
many credit providers becoming risk averse, refusing to lend to lower-income consumers who 
had no security.97 Nevertheless, 2010 brought stability and control through the entrance of 
new participants into the unsecured market in the form of large banks such as Absa Bank, 




89 Ibid. Furthermore, according to section 2 the MFRC Rules available at 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-south-africa-rules-of-the-
microfinance-regulatory-council-jul-2002.pdf, accessed on 20 November 2018 at 2,  such lenders 
include a close corporation, company, trust, statutory entity or a bank. 
90 Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 3). 
91 Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 3). This was inter alia due to the fact that banks rarely 
assessed the affordability of borrowers. 
92 South African Human Rights Commission (note 28 above; 18). 
See also Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 3) and Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 7).  
93 Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 4).  
94 Ibid 
95 Ibid 




Nedbank, Standard Bank and FirstRand Bank.98 Whilst Absa Bank made the decision to 
reduce its involvement in the sector, it was clear that unsecured credit was deliberately 
targeted by other banks due to the large profit margins.99 This was highlighted in published 
NCR figures which showed consumers being charged beyond the cost of the loan itself, with 
hidden costs such as initiation fees and high interest.100 These figures, together with figures 
released by the NCR in 2011 showing an increase in unsecured lending,101 and a rise in the 
number of impaired credit records, raised concerns.102 These apprehensions were echoed by 
African Bank Limited who had warned about the speed of growth of these loans.103  
Following the Marikana massacre in 2012, investigations revealed high instances of reckless 
lending in respect of unsecured loans and the Minister of Finance was forced to call a meeting 
with banks to request the tightening of unsecured lending.104 An ensuing agreement known as 
the ‘Ensuring Responsible Market Conduct for Bank Lending’105 consequently resulted in 
unsecured loans being provided to higher-income earners who posed little to no risk.106 This 
position is reflected today. In 2017, the NCR released statistics in its Consumer Credit Market 
Report (‘CCMR’) which showed that there was a decrease in the number of unsecured credit 
agreements being granted to consumers with a grossly income of less that R10 000 per 
month.107 The same report highlighted the fact that more unsecured credit agreements were 
being granted to consumers with a monthly income of more than R15 000.108 The 
aforementioned figures can be used to illustrate the reality of increased regulation leading to 
                                                          
98 Ibid 5-6.  
99 South African Human Rights Commission (note 28 above; 20).  
See also Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 11) in which it is contended that between the years of 2006 
and 2007, lenders tried to extend as much unsecured credit as possible. 
100 Compliance & Risk Resources (Pty) Ltd (Final Report) Research on the Increase of Unsecured 
Loans in South Africa’s Credit Market (2012) available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/aug12/UPL%20Report%2047%20Final.pdf, accessed on 15 March 2018 at 63. See also 
Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 8). 
101 National Credit Regulator Annual Report (2011/2012) available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Financial%20Statement/NCR%20Annual%20Report%20201
1-12.pdf, accessed on 3 December 2018 at 14 in which the NCR report submitted that there was an 
increase in the number of South Africans relying on unsecured credit (as at December 2011, 
unsecured credit comprised of 24,58% of all new credit granted). 
102 Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 8). See also National Credit Regulator (note 101 above; 
19) which stated that, as of December 2011, the number of consumers with impaired records was 
8,93 million which constituted 46,2% of credit active consumers). Additionally, see National Credit 
Regulator (note 21 above) in which the CEO, Nomsa Motshegare, acknowledges the concerns 
surrounding unsecured credit, identifies undesirable practices, and cautions credit providers.  
103 Ibid 9. 
104 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 24).  
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid 16. 


































To properly assess the impact that the NCA has on consumers with regards to unsecured 
credit, it is necessary to analyse, and critique certain provisions of the aforementioned Act. 
This chapter will examine both the preamble and the purpose of the NCA and will assess 
whether certain provisions relating to unsecured credit fulfils the NCA’s stated objectives of 
proving credit to low-income consumers. 
3.2 THE PURPOSE OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 34 OF 2005 
3.2.1 Preamble and Section 3109 
The Preamble contains the main objective of the NCA. It includes phrases which, for the 
purposes of this research paper, are of particular importance. Amongst other aims, the 
Preamble states that the NCA was implemented to provide for ‘access to consumer credit’. 
Furthermore, it declares that the NCA aims to ensure ‘improved standards of consumer 
information’ and strives to ‘promote responsible credit granting and use’.110 
Section 3 provides the over-arching purpose of the NCA which is to ‘promote and advance the 
social and economic welfare’ of South African consumers and to promote, amongst other 
things, a ‘transparent’, ‘responsible’ and ‘accessible’ credit market. Section 3 subsequently 
lists various means by which the NCA seeks to protect consumers, which includes: the 
promotion and development of ‘a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans’ 
especially for those who, ‘historically’, were ‘unable to access credit’;111 the certification of a 
responsible credit market by ‘encouraging responsible borrowing’ and ensuring ‘the avoidance 
of over-indebtedness’ and the ‘fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers’;112 and by the 
correcting of imbalances of bargaining power between consumers and credit providers by 
‘providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised information in order to make 
informed choices.’113 
The aforementioned objectives of the NCA have the recurring theme of improving access to 
credit, promoting responsible borrowing and improving the imbalance between consumers 
and credit providers through disclosure.  
3.2.2 Significant Definitions 
                                                          
109 34 of 2005 
110 Preamble of the NCA 34 of 2005 
111 Section 3(a) of the NCA 34 of 2005 
112 Section 3(c)(i) of the NCA 34 of 2005 
113 Section 3(e)(ii) of the NCA 34 of 2005 
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When examining the provisions contained in the NCA and its regulations, it is necessary to 
first take cognisance of fundamental definitions to facilitate analysis and understanding.  
Some of the most important definitions are contained in section 1 of the NCA,114 including the 
definitions of ‘consumer’,115‘credit’,116 ‘credit agreement’117 and ‘credit provider’.118 However, 
some terms, deemed necessary for the purposes of this research paper, are not defined in 
the NCA. For instance, the definition of ‘interest’ is not included in the NCA and is therefore 
presumed to possess its ordinary meaning, being money charged for the extension of an 
amount of credit.119 
 
It is also interesting to note that although the term ‘secured loan’120 is defined in the NCA, 
there is no prescribed definition for ‘unsecured loan’. To establish its meaning, reference 
needs to be made to regulation 39(3) which provides a description of the term ‘unsecured 
credit transaction’, stating that it is a ‘credit transaction in respect of which the debt is not 
supported by any pledge or other right in property or suretyship or any other form of personal 
                                                          
114 34 of 2005 
115 Section 1 of the NCA 34 of 2005 defines a consumer, in respect of a credit agreement as: (a) the 
party to whom goods or services are sold under a discount transaction, incidental credit agreement or 
instalment agreement; (b) the party to whom money is paid, or credit granted, under a pawn 
transaction; (c) the party to whom credit is granted under a credit facility; (d) the mortgagor under a 
mortgage agreement; (e) the borrower under a secured loan; (f) the lessee under a lease; (g) the 
guarantor under a credit guarantee; or (h) the party to whom or at whose direction money is advanced 
or credit granted under any other credit agreement. 
116 Section 1of the NCA 34 of 2005 defines credit as (a) a deferral of payment of money owed to a 
person, or a promise to defer such a payment; or (b) a promise to advance or pay money to or at the 
direction of another person. 
117 Section 1 of the NCA 34 of 2005 defines a credit agreement as ‘an agreement that meets all the 
criteria set out in section 8’. Section 8 provides that a credit agreement includes a credit facility, a 
credit transaction, a credit guarantee, or a combination thereof. It further excludes an insurance 
policy, a lease for immovable property and an agreement relating to a Stokvel.  
118 Section 1 of the NCA 34 of 2005 defines a credit provider as (a) the party who supplies goods or 
services under a discount transaction, incidental credit agreement or instalment agreement; (b) the 
party who advances money or credit under a pawn transaction; (c) the party who extends credit under 
a credit facility; (d) the mortgagee under a mortgage agreement; (e) the lender under a secured loan; 
( f ) the lessor under a lease; (g) the party to whom an assurance or promise is made under a credit 
guarantee; (h) the party who advances money or credit to another under any other credit agreement; 
or (i) any other person who acquires the rights of a credit provider under a credit agreement after it 
has been entered into. 
119 Otto (note 35 above; 91). See also South African Reserve Bank Interest rates and how they work 
available at 
https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Documents/Interest%20rates%20and%20how%20they%20work.
pdf, accessed on 10 August 2018 at 2 whereby the South African Reserve Bank defines interest as 
the price paid to a lender of funds ‘for the right to use the accumulated funds’. The English Oxford 
Dictionary further describes interest as ‘money paid regularly at a particular rate for the use of money 
lent, or for delaying the repayment of a debt’. 
120 Section 1 of the NCA 34 of 2005 defines a secured loan as ‘an agreement, irrespective of its form 
but not including an instalment agreement, in terms of which a person (a) advances money or grants 
credit to another, and (b) retains, or receives a pledge or cession of the title to any movable property 
or other thing of value as security for all amounts due under that agreement.’ 
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security other than credit life insurance’.121 There seems to be no indication as to why the 
legislature excluded this definition from the NCA itself. A possible reason for not including a 
definition of unsecured credit is that at the time the NCA was drafted, unsecured lending was 
not as widespread as it is today.  
 
3.3 COST OF CREDIT 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Sections 101-106 of the NCA deals with the fees and charges that credit providers are entitled 
to charge consumers, as well as regulations 40-44. The NCA also makes provision for 
maximum rates of interest, fees and other charges. 
3.3.2 Fees, charges and the ‘in duplum’ rule 
3.3.2.1 Section 101 
Section 101122 contains a comprehensive list of fees, charges and interest that credit providers 
may charge,123 and reference is given to them throughout this chapter. This section provides 
that, in terms of a credit agreement, a credit provider may not require payment by the 
consumer of ‘any money or consideration’ except for the following:124  
a) the principal debt, being the amount deferred in terms of the agreement, plus the value 
of any item contemplated in section 102; 
b) an initiation fee; 
c) a service fee, which 
(iii) must not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt; 
d)  interest, which 
(ii) must not exceed the applicable maximum prescribed rate determined in terms of 
section 105; 
e) cost of any credit insurance provided in accordance with section 106; 
f) default administration charges 
g) collection costs 
 
                                                          
121 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above). 
122 34 of 2005 
123 Otto (note 35 above; 89). 
124 Section 101(1) of the NCA 34 of 2005 
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Of particular importance is section 103 (5)125 which provides a statutory ‘in duplum’ rule126 and 
states that: 
‘Despite any provision of the common law or a credit agreement to the contrary, the amounts 
contemplated in section 101 (1) (b) to (g) that accrue during the time that a consumer is in 
default under the credit agreement may not, in aggregate, exceed the unpaid balance [own 
emphasis added] of the principal debt under that credit agreement as at the time that the 
default occurs.’ [own emphasis added] 
3.3.2.2 Analysis 
Section 101 prevents creditors from charging consumers any money or consideration for items 
not listed in terms of a credit agreement. The term ‘consideration’ is not defined in the NCA, 
however, the court stated in Evans v Smith and Another 2011 (4) SA 472 (WCC)127 that the 
exact nature of the consideration did not matter. The words ‘charge, fee or interest’ are 
therefore of ‘wide import’ and will include any amount payable in respect of a credit agreement 
where payment has been deferred.128   
For the purposes of this research paper, certain charges listed in section 101 will be 
considered. 
An ‘initiation fee’ can be defined as the fee payable to a credit provider for the costs involved 
in initiating the credit agreement.129 There have, however, been arguments that the exact 
purpose of the initiation fee is ‘unclear’,130 and that this therefore ‘allows for a loophole’.131 The 
reasoning behind this is that low-income consumers who are not able to afford such a fee in 
advance of obtaining the loan, will be lured by credit providers into taking another separate 
loan to cover the initiation cost.132  
A ‘service fee’ is charged periodically for routine costs relating to the administration of 
maintaining the credit agreement. Depending on the type of credit agreement, the service fee 
is charged monthly, annually or per transaction.133 What is interesting to note is section 
101(c)(iii)134 which states that the service fee cannot exceed the prescribed amount relative to 
                                                          
125 34 of 2005 
126 Otto (note 54 above; 562).  
127 Page 10 para 17 
128 Otto (note 35 above; 89).  
129 Ibid 91. 
130 J Campbell ‘The Excessive Cost of Credit on Small Money Loans under the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 262. For further implications regarding the initiation fee, see pages 
260-262. 
131 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 80). 
132 Ibid 
133 Otto (note 35 above; 91).  
134 34 of 2005 
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the principal debt. According to the regulations,135 the maximum service fee that consumers 
can be charged is a flat-rate of R60. This provision clearly does not differentiate between 
consumers who use their accounts frequently and are more ‘financially active’ as opposed to 
those who use their accounts sparingly.136 Campbell portrays the negative effects of this ’flat-
rate’ by comparing the loan amount with the service fee amount expressed as a percentage 
relative to the loan amount.137 In so doing, it becomes apparent that smaller loans are provided 
to consumers at inflated rates, thus allowing providers of small loans for short periods to make 
substantial profits. Whilst this may not be unduly cumbersome on wealthier consumers, lower-
income consumers are excessively disadvantaged.138  
‘Interest’, as explained above, is not defined in the NCA but refers to money that is charged 
for the extension of credit.139 Section 101(d)(ii)140 prevents a credit provider charging a 
consumer more than what is allowed in terms of the regulations prescribing maximum rates. 
Prior to the NCA, to prevent credit providers from exploiting consumers (especially in respect 
of interest) consumers could only rely on the common law ‘in duplum’ rule. The rule provided 
relief for consumers by ensuring that any arrear amounts and unpaid interest on a loan could 
not exceed the outstanding capital of the borrowed amount.141 In other words, interest stopped 
running when the amount of the unpaid interest equalled the outstanding capital amount.142 
The consumer was therefore required to make payments on the loan amount in order to 
decrease the amount of interest charged.143 The NCA has since enacted section 103(5)144 to 
preserve this rule and to extend it by ensuring that the moment a consumer defaults on his or 
her loan (as long as it is a credit agreement in terms of the NCA), all amounts contemplated 
in section 101 will stop running when they reach the outstanding balance of the principal 
debt.145  
                                                          
135 Regulation 44 of GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above). 
136 Otto (note 35 above; 100).  
137 Campbell (note 130 above; 262). If we use the same example provided by Campbell but substitute 
the previous R50 with the current flat-rate of R60, the figures are as follows: If the loan amount is 
R200 and the service fee is R60, the monthly cost of the service fee relative to the loan amount is 
30% per month, whilst the annual cost of the service fee relative to the loan amount is 360% per year. 
In contrast, if the loan amount is R10 000, the monthly cost of the service fee relative to the loan 
amount is only 0,6% per month, whilst the annual cost of the service fee relative to the loan amount is 
7.2% per year.  
138 Ibid 
139 Otto (note 35 above; 91).  
140 34 of 2005 
141 Otto (note 35 above; 95).  
142 Kelly-Louw & Stoop (note 57 above; 251). 
143 Ibid 
144 34 of 2005 
145 Kelly-Louw & Stoop (note 57 above; 255). For example, if X, being the consumer, owes Y, the 
credit provider, R5000, the total amount of all costs owing on that loan, including interest, initiation 
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The NCA has therefore introduced vital amendments to the common law position,146 by 
extending the ceasing of costs to all costs contemplated in section 101,147 and not just to 
interest. In addition, the NCA only allows costs to accrue again once the consumer is no longer 
in default. This is as opposed to the common law which allows for interest to continue running 
the moment the defaulting consumer makes a payment.148  
3.3.2.3 Correspondence to the aims of the NCA 
When considering the various costs prescribed by the NCA, several conclusions can be 
drawn. The first is that, when the prescribed costs are accumulated, smaller loans are more 
expensive.149 This bodes negatively for lower-income consumers who commonly rely on small, 
short-term loans.  
One of the fundamental aims of the NCA is to make credit cheaper and more accessible for 
consumers. Furthermore, the NCA aims to prevent the over-indebtedness of consumers. 
When comparing the costs of credit, the NCA is not achieving its objectives in this respect as 
the pricing structure appears to cater for larger loans which people with more money can 
afford. This means that poorer people who require smaller loans and whom the NCA aims to 
socially and economically advance, suffer the harsh consequences of not being able to repay 
these loans. 
The ‘in duplum’ rule can perhaps be viewed as a ‘saving grace’ in this context as it effectively 
creates a lid on the amount of charges on a defaulting loan, to the amount of the loan and thus 
protects consumers from being trapped in a debt spiral that is impossible to escape from.150 
In this way, the NCA fulfils its aims of avoiding over-indebtedness.  
In addition, the list of fees, interest and other charges may aid in concealing the true cost of 
the loan itself.151 For example, in a report released by the NCR, it showed that over 30 per 
cent of revenue generated from unsecured loans consisted of initiation fees, services fees and 
credit life insurance.152 Consumers, especially those who are financially illiterate, will not 
                                                          
fees, services fees etc, may not exceed the principal amount of R5000 during the time that X is in 
default. 
146 It should be noted that in Nedbank Ltd and Others v The National Credit Regulator and Another 
2011 (4) All SA 131 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that although section 103(5) deals with 
the same subject matter as the common law rule, it is not a ‘codification’ of this position and is a self-
standing provision-page 21 para 38 
147 34 of 2005 
148 Kelly-Louw & Stoop (note 57 above; 262). For more differences regarding the statutory and 
common law ‘in duplum’ rule, refer to page 262. 
149 Campbell (note 130 above; 266). Refer to tabulated examples on the same page which show the 
costs of different types of loans at the different rates. 
150 Otto (note 35 above; 95).  
151 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 22).  
152 Leriba Consulting Limited (note 68 above; 22). 
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comprehend the accumulation of these ‘hidden’ costs. This, in turn, defeats a further aim of 
the NCA, namely the ability of consumers to make informed choices.  
It can therefore be contended that although the NCA seeks to ensure the cost of credit is 
always disclosed, the way it has been drafted may be overburdensome to consumers.  
3.3.3. Maximum rates of interest, fees and other charges 
3.3.3.1 Relevant provisions 
Section 103(6) states that ‘The Minister may make regulations prescribing the manner in which 
interest is to be calculated and disclosed for the purposes of this Act. 153  
This coincides with section 105(1) of the NCA,154 which allows the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (hereinafter ‘the Minister’), after consulting with the NCR, to prescribe regulations for 
the calculation of a ‘maximum rate of interest’ and ‘maximum fees’ for each subsector of the 
consumer credit market.155 Effectively this means that costs are capped at specific amounts 
in respect the charges contemplated in section 101, according to different types of credit 
agreements.156 
When determining these maximum rates, the Minister must also have due regard to the 
following factors, as per section 105(2):157 
(a) the need to make credit available to persons contemplated in section 13 (a);158  
(b) conditions prevailing in the credit market, including the cost of credit and the optimal  
functioning of the consumer credit market; and  
(c) the social impact on low income consumers. 
 
In this regard, reference must be made to regulation 42(1) and (2) which deal with maximum 
prescribed interest rates and maximum initiation fees respectively,159 and regulation 44 which 
prescribes the maximum services fee.160 
                                                          
153 34 of 2005 
154 34 of 2005 
155 Section 105(1)(a) and (b) of the NCA 34 of 2005 
156 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 8). 
157 34 of 2005 
158 These persons include (i) historically disadvantaged persons; (ii) low income persons and 
communities; and (iii) remote, isolated or low density populations and communities. 
159 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above). 
160 Ibid 56. 
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Regulation 42(1) states that the maximum interest rate for an unsecured credit transaction is 
Repo Rate (‘RR’) +21% per year.161  The formula for establishing the maximum rate of interest 
that can be charged for an unsecured loan is as follows:  
 
RR (which is currently 6.5%) x 2.2 + 21% per annum.162 Therefore, the maximum rate of 
interest for unsecured loans is currently 35.3% per annum.  
 
Regulation 42(2)163 prescribes the maximum initiation fee for unsecured credit transactions, 
being R165 per credit agreement, plus 10% of the amount in excess of R1 000’164 up to and 
not exceeding R1 050.  
 
Regulation 44 states that the maximum service fee per month is R60, and further:165 
 
(1) Where an annual service fee is levied, the applicable limit is 
(a) the monthly limit on the service fee, multiplied by 12,166 and 
(b) where the period for which the fee is levied is less than 12 months, the monthly service 
fee multiplied by the number of months in such a period. 
 
In addition, regulation 45167 obliges the NCR to periodically review the limitations on interest 
and other fees, and when providing recommendations to the Minister, take into consideration 
aspects such as access to finance for persons contemplated in section 13(a), including those 
persons historically unable to access credit. This occurred in 2015 when the Minister published 
a Draft Review regarding the limitations on fees and interest and invited public comment,168 
and thereafter published a Final Review.169 
 
3.3.3.2 Analysis 
                                                          
161 Ibid 53. 
162 For example, if an unsecured loan amount is R1500, the amount of interest on that loan per annum 
is a R529.50. 
163 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above; 54). 
164 For example, if an unsecured loan amount is R1500, the initiation fee will be R165+R150 (10% of 
R1500) which will total R315.  
165 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above; 56). 
166 For example, if an unsecured loan is R1500, the service fee is a flat rate of R60X12 months which 
equals R720. 
167 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above; 57). 
168 GN 655 of GG 38911, 25/06/2015 available at https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39379.pdf, 
accessed on 10 March 2018. For example, see page 9 which stated that the proposed maximum 
interest rate for unsecured credit agreements was (RRx1.7) + 15% per year, ad contrast this with the 
prescribed maximum in the final review on page 109, which states that the maximum prescribed 
interest rate for unsecured loans is RR+21% per year.  




The regulations pertaining to the ability of the Minister to calculate and provide for maximum 
rates of interest and other costs will henceforth be referred to as the ‘enabling provisions.’  
 
The enabling provisions allow the Minister to implement regulations affecting the maximum 
rates of interest, initiation fees and services fees, amongst other charges. It is necessary to 
note, however, that before implementing such regulations, the Minister is obliged to consult 
with the NCR.170 The NCR consists of a body of economic experts and is led by a qualified 
Chartered Accountant as its CEO.171 Such consultation is beneficial to the Minister as the NCA 
requires the NCR to monitor and report on various matters such as the availability of credit, 
credit market conditions, access to consumer credit and participation in the credit market by 
historically disadvantaged persons.172 Furthermore, the Minister must consider various factors 
prior to enacting the regulations, such as the necessity for the availability of credit and the 
resulting impact that the Regulations will have on low-income consumers.173  
 
The requirement that the Minister consult with stakeholders and consider various factors 
ensures that the impact of the regulations does not derail the objectives of the NCA. 
 
It is also necessary to note that the rates contained in the regulations are not determined 
arbitrarily by those with little to no experience or knowledge about the credit market.174 Apart 
from consulting with the NCR, the Minister, prior to enacting the regulations, must consult with 
experts in the financial industry, and with participants of the industry itself.175  
 
It can be contended that credit legislation aims to create a ‘broad-stroke’ framework for credit, 
however, there still exists unintended consequences. For example, the second Exemption 
Notice attempted regulatory intervention, however, loopholes in the Notice were still exploited 
by credit providers who provided a series of loans to consumers under R10 000 and in doing 
so, exceeded the parameters of the Usury Act and were permitted to charge high interest 
rates.176  
 
                                                          
170 Section 105 of Act 34 of 2005. 
171 M Whittaker ‘South Africa’s National Credit Act: A possible Model for the proper Role of Interest 
Rate Ceilings for Microfinance’ (2008) 28(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
573. 
172 Section 13(c)(i)-(v) of Act 34 of 2005. 
173 Section 105(2)(a)-(c) of Act 34 of 2005. 
174 Whittaker (note 171 above; 573).  
175 Ibid. An example of such a participant is a credit lender such as a bank. 
176 Kelly-Louw (note 39 above; 203). 
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It is therefore clear that based on South Africa’s consumer credit history, there was a need to 
regulate the costs of credit.177 Similarly, there also existed a need to create a balance between 
the control of these charges to prevent exploitation of consumers, whilst simultaneously 
allowing credit providers to profit.  
The NCA, through its regulations, introduced caps on various charges but increased the limits 
on these caps. This allowed lower income consumers to access formal credit and seek shelter 
from exploitation under the provisions of the NCA, whilst enabling credit providers to profit.178 
It can therefore be submitted that the NCA has a measured approach to credit in that it seeks 
to protect consumers whilst allowing credit providers to generate financial gain. 
Advocates of these price controls state that they are a ‘significant improvement’ 179 to previous 
credit legislation in South Africa and uphold that the caps attract reliable creditors and 
safeguard consumers from excessive rates.180 There are, however, opposing views to the 
price controls introduced by the NCA. Although the NCA introduced the caps to incentivise 
credit providers into providing credit to those who were previously excluded from the credit 
market, arguments have been made that these caps are not viewed by credit providers as 
‘maximum’ rates, but rather as the prescribed rate they can charge for different forms of credit 
transactions.181 This, in turn, prevents consumers from obtaining access to credit at 
competitive rates.182 In relation to unsecured credit, some of these maximum rates are 
particularly high when compared to the more formal (secured) forms of credit, such as 
mortgage agreements.183  
Further, it has been contended that due to the imposed limits, especially with regards to the 
reduction in interest rates that credit providers are allowed to charge, consumers who are 
considered high risk will be denied access to formal finance.184 This is due to the fact that 
lenders usually charge such consumers higher rates of interest to negate the risk they are 
undertaking by loaning them money.185 Consequently, these consumers will have to satisfy 
their credit needs through alternative sources, who might not necessarily fall within the ambit 
of the NCA, such as usurers,186 and will therefore be vulnerable to exploitation.187  
                                                          
177 Kelly-Louw & Stoop (note 57 above; 231). 
178 National Credit Regulator (note 27 above; 61).  
179 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 21).  
180 Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw (note 6 above; 48). 
181 Ellyne & Jourdan (note 3 above; 23). 
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183 For example, the maximum rate of interest for mortgage agreements is RR+12% per year, 
compared to unsecured credit where the maximum rate of interest is RR+21% per year.  
184 Compliance & Risk Resources (Pty) Ltd (note 100 above; 18). 
185 Ibid 42. 
186 In other words, loan sharks. 
187 Compliance & Risk Resources (Pty) Ltd (note 100 above; 18). 
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In the case of Micro Finance South Africa v Minister of Trade and Industry and Another,188 
which dealt with an application for an order staying the implementation of the regulations 
prescribing maximum rates of interest and other fees, the Minister conceded that there were 
submissions received after the publishing of the draft regulations. These submissions 
expressed concerns that the lowering of the maximum interest rate would result in a situation 
whereby credit providers would not consider it ‘economically viable’ to lend to lower-income, 
higher risk consumers and that this would especially affect those consumers who relied on 
unsecured and short-term loans.189 Evidence to attest to this submission was provided by an 
expert witness and economist, who stated that the proposed regulations would reduce access 
to credit for low-income and rural consumers and would further urge credit providers to focus 
on high earners with secure employment.190  
Many of these commendations and criticisms hold true. In 2009, after the NCA and its 
regulations were implemented, overall access to credit was shown to have improved.191 
Furthermore, research showed that although the maximum fees were being treated as 
prescribed fees, the limits were being observed by credit providers.192 However, concerns 
were raised about lower-income consumers having reduced access to credit (having access 
to only about 1.4 per cent of the total credit distributed) and that these consumers were left 
with credit options such as unsecured credit and short-term loans.193 The year 2015 witnessed 
a ‘ballooning’ of nearly 30 per cent of the issuing of unsecured loans by lenders which occurred 
after the government proposed the amended caps contained in the current regulations. It was 
clear that lenders had attempted to maximise their profits under the then-current higher 
interest rate.194 
Today, although the total number of credit applications being rejected has decreased, the 
share of unsecured credit agreements that have been granted to lower-income consumers by 
credit providers has also decreased. Statistics show that this decrease pertains mainly to 
consumers who earn less that R10 000 per month; whilst credit providers have favoured 
                                                          
188 Micro Finance South Africa v Minister of Trade and Industry and Another (16746/2016) [2016] 
ZAGPPHC 1155 (22 November 2016) 
189 (16746/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1155 (22 November 2016) para 8. 
190 Ibid para 16. 
191 Feasibility (Pty) Ltd (Research Report Summary) Pricing of and Access to Consumer Credit: a 
review of the impact of the National Credit Act one year after its implementation (2009) available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
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192 Ibid 4. 
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194 ‘Unsecured lending jumps 30% ahead of interest rate caps’ Daly Group 4 October 2014, available 
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granting unsecured credit to consumers who earn more than R15 000 per month.195 The latter 
statistics which illustrate credit providers turning lower-income consumers away in favour of 
higher-income earners who pose little to no risk, echo the concerns voiced by critics of the 
caps and the views expressed in the Micro Finance196 case. 
3.3.3.3 Correspondence to the aims of the NCA 
The need for price controls on loans is not without merit as they aid in the prevention of 
reckless lending,197 and safeguard consumers against taking out loans they cannot afford and 
becoming overindebted.198 The Minister’s decision to increase the caps on various categories 
of credit costs such as the interest rate, ensure that credit providers can continue lending at a 
profit, whist maintaining consumer protection.199  
It is clear, however, that the pricing of loans has a direct impact on access to credit. If access 
to formal credit is limited, those who earn less are considered higher risk will have to satisfy 
their credit needs through alternative (and possibly unregulated) sources, such as usurers.200 
By forcing consumers to turn to unregulated, high-cost sources of credit, the NCA facilitates 
over-indebtedness rather than preventing it, contrary to the aims stated in section 3.  
3.4. DISCLOSURE  
3.4.1 Introduction 
Otto and Grove, in examining the Usury Act, distinguished between three phases of disclosure 
concerning credit agreements, namely, pre-agreement disclosure, contractual disclosure and 
post-contractual disclosure.201 Similarly, the NCA makes provision for these stages of 
                                                          
195 National Credit Regulator (Executive Summary) Consumer Credit Market Report (2018) available 
at https://www.consumerprofilebureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CPB-CCMR-2018Q1.pdf, 
accessed on 20 March 2018 at 15. Note that these statistics reflect the end of the first quarter of the 
year 2018, namely from 1 January to 31 March 2018. It was shown that there was a decrease from 
38.68% to 35.19% in the number of unsecured credit agreements granted to those with a gross 
monthly income of up to R10 000. In the same period, there was an increase in unsecured credit 
granted to those with a gross monthly income of more than R15 000, from 63.37% to 65.85%. 
196 (16746/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1155 (22 November 2016) 
197 Whittaker (note 171 above; 565).  
198 See National Credit Regulator v Murphy & Sons Cash Loans CC NCT-82548-2017-57(1), in which 
the respondent, a credit provider, was alleged, amongst other things, to have charged interest on the 
principal debt in excess of the stipulated amount. The NCT, in casu, found that the respondent had 
contravened the NCA and its Regulations and ordered that the credit provider refund the consumers 
who had been charged excess amounts. This case serves as evidence that the NCA is effective in 
deterring non-abiding credit providers.  
199 National Credit Regulator (note 27 above; 61). 
200 Compliance & Risk Resources (Pty) Ltd (note 100 above; 18). Also note that another word for 
‘usurer’ is ‘loan shark’. 
201 Grove & Otto (note 48 above: 84-89).  
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disclosure through certain provisions, which will subsequently be discussed.202These so called 
‘truth-in-lending’ laws aim to facilitate transparency in negotiations between consumers and 
credit providers are significant to consumers who are in unequal bargaining positions.203 For 
the purposes of this research paper, only selected provisions of the NCA will be dealt with.  
3.4.2 Relevant provisions 
3.4.2.1 Pre-agreement Disclosure 
Section 92 of the NCA assists pre-agreement disclosure by obliging credit providers to give 
consumers a pre-agreement and a quotation which sets out the proposed costs of the 
agreement such as the principal debt, the proposed distribution of that principal debt, the 
interest rate and other costs, and the total cost of the agreement.204  The NCA further provides 
that the quotation will be binding on the credit provider for at least five business days before 
the agreement is entered into. 205 
Fundamental provisions contained in the NCA are sections 80-82 which deal with the 
prevention of reckless credit by credit providers206.  
Prior to a consumer obtaining credit, a credit provider is obliged to take reasonable steps to 
assess that consumer’s understanding of the risks, costs, obligations and rights involved; their 
debt repayment history as a credit consumer; and their existing financial means, prospects 
and obligations.207 In determining a consumer’s capacity to afford the loan, a credit provider is 
entitled to implement its own evaluative assessment method, provided it is capable of reaching 
a fair and objective outcome.208 Alternatively, the Minister may publish guidelines on the 
                                                          
202 P N Stoop ‘Disclosure as an Indirect Measure Aimed at Preventing Over-indebtedness’ (2013) 
available at 
https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/47/327/lawclinicdraftpapersfromconference/ph
illipstoopdraft.pdf, accessed on 24 July 2018 at 4. 
203 Whittaker (note 171 above; 572). 
204 Section 92(2)(b) of Act 34 of 2005. 
205 Section 92(3)(a) and (b) of Act 34 of 2005. 
206 Section 80 provides that a credit agreement is reckless if, at the time that the agreement was 
made, or at the time when the amount approved in terms of the agreement is increased, other than an 
increase in terms of section 119 (4): a) the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as 
required by section 81 (2), irrespective of what the outcome of such an assessment might have 
concluded at the time; or (b) the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required by 
section 81 (2), entered into the credit agreement with the consumer despite the fact that the 
information made available to the credit provider indicated that— (i) the consumer did not generally 
understand or appreciate the consumer’s risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit 
agreement; or (ii) entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer over-indebted. 
207 Section 81(2)(i)-(iii) of Act 34 of 2005. Note that section 81(1) also requires the consumer to 
answer any questions posed by the credit provider in conducting the affordability assessment, fully 
and truthfully. 
208 Section 82(1) of Act 34 of 2005. 
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mechanisms or procedures which can be applied to determine a consumer’s affordability.209 
Regulation 23A sets out the criteria that must be applied by credit providers when conducting 
an affordability assessment.210 According to this regulation, credit providers are required to 
take practical steps to ascertain the consumer’s gross income and thus foresee whether he or 
she will be able to afford the proposed credit instalments.211  
3.4.2.2 Contractual Disclosure 
Contractual disclosure is fulfilled through section 93 which compels the credit provider to 
deliver a copy of the credit agreement, at no charge, either in paper form or electronically,212 
and which must be in a prescribed form.213 Regulation 31 prescribes the requirements for an 
intermediate or large credit agreement,214 and includes the condition that the agreement must 
be ‘clear, comprehensive, concise and in plain language.’ 215 In addition, the credit provider is 
obliged to disclose all the information from the quotation in a tabular format, labelled ‘Cost of 
Credit’ on the front page of the credit agreement (if the quotation does not form part of the 
agreement).216 The ‘Cost of Credit’ contained in the agreement must reflect the fees contained 
in the quotation, which include the principal amount, the initiation and service fee, the rate of 
interest to be levied, the nature and cost of the insurance provided, default administration 
charges, collection costs etc.217  Furthermore, the credit provider is obliged to disclose the 
sum of the aforementioned amounts, and where this is not ascertainable, then the method for 
calculating the amount must be disclosed.218 Notably, the credit provider is also obliged to 
state the number and frequency of repayments on the loan as well as the duration of the 
agreement and the total amount of repayments required. 219 
                                                          
209 Section 82(2)(b) of Act 34 of 2005. It should also be noted that, according to section 82(4), if the 
National Consumer Tribunal finds that a credit provider has not met its obligations in terms of section 
81 or has not utilised evaluation mechanisms which result in a fair and objective assessment, the 
Tribunal may require the credit provider to apply the guidelines published by the Minister, or apply 
alternative guidelines within the practices of the industry.   
210 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above; 29-33). 
211 Further, this regulation requires credit providers to validate a consumer’s gross income by 
considering factors such as his or her payslips, proof of income, bank statements and financial 
statements. Some examples of affordability assessment questions can include the consumer’s total 
monthly expenditure (including any mortgage instalments/rent, car instalments, and living expenses); 
their basic salary; and their average monthly income as per their payslip.  
212 Section 93(1) of Act 34 of 2005. 
213 Section 93(2) and (3) of Act 34 of 2005. 
214 GN 1080 of GG 39379 (note 4 above; 40-46). 
215 Ibid 40. 
216 Ibid 41 Regulation 31(1)(e). 
217 Ibid 41-43 Regulation 31(2)(c)(i) - (xxii). These requirements refer only to intermediate or large 
credit agreements. 
218 Ibid 43 Regulation 31(1)(g) and (h). 
219 Ibid 43-44 Regulation 31(1)(k). 
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It can be submitted that the amount of information and the prescribed manner in which it is to 
be disclosed may render such information difficult to read or understand, and further, may 
conceal important information behind a collection of words. 
3.4.2.3 Post-contractual Disclosure 
Post-contractual disclosure is facilitated through various provisions. Importantly, section 108 
provides for the issuing of periodic statements of account.220 Regulation 35 prescribes the 
information to be included in such statements, including, but not limited to, the details of the 
credit provider and consumer; the details of the credit agreement; a summary of the 
transactions occurring up to the period of the statement as well as details of each transaction 
including the amount of each transaction; and any fees or charges levied, or interest 
incurred.221  
Consumers are also entitled, as per section 110,222 to request statements of account which 
the credit provider must accommodate, and which include information such as any amounts 
owing or currently payable, and the current balance on the consumer’s account. This provision 
coincides with section 113,223 which allows the consumer to request a statement of the amount 
needing to be paid to settle an account.  
The aforementioned provisions have the positive consequence of ensuring that consumers 
are aware of their existing debts, and in addition encourage awareness and education 
concerning credit.  
3.4.3 Analysis 
One of the fundamental aims of the NCA is to provide for improved standards of information 
to allow consumers to make informed choices, and to correct the imbalance of bargaining 
power between the credit provider and the consumer.  
The provisions relating to pre-disclosure, such as the establishment of a quotation, enables 
the consumer to ‘shop around’224 and compare prices provided by various credit providers in 
order to obtain the best price for a credit agreement. Further, it allows consumers, when 
examining the costs of credit disclosed, to make an informed choice when deciding whether 
to enter into the agreement.225 Consumers of credit are likewise, in theory, able to obtain credit 
                                                          
220 34 of 2005 
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at a competitive rate.226 Pre-agreement disclosure can be viewed as an ‘indirect measure’ in 
preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, by dissuading them from entering into more 
credit agreements for which they are not able to financially endure.227  
However, although these provisions aim to promote transparency and consumer 
understanding, these aims are frustrated when financially illiterate consumers who apply for 
credit, have trouble comprehending the context and impact of the various costs disclosed.228 
As a result, vulnerable consumers may choose loans which have a lower repayment amount 
every month, but which attract higher accumulated costs and have a longer term of repayment.  
Importantly, even if a credit agreement is concluded orally, it must be reduced to writing.229 
Disclosure of the contract itself, such as allowing the consumer to obtain a copy of the 
agreement, enables said consumer to have proof of the agreement. This creates an 
enforceable right for consumers and a corresponding obligation for credit providers.230 The 
pre-agreement quotation and the copy of the agreement thereby enables the consumer to 
determine the total cost of the loan, what it is comprised of, and the amount of payments he 
or she will be expected to make over the stipulated period to satisfy the debt. This assists the 
consumer in planning his or her financial administration.231   
However, merely providing the consumer with a copy of the agreement and disclosing costs 
and terms, does not benefit consumers who are not able to read or comprehend lengthy, 
formal contracts that contain complicated information which is difficult to understand.232 In this 
respect, the reckless lending provisions are a welcome relief and act as a ‘red line’233 for 
consumers who risk being exploited due to lack of understanding.234 The affordability 
assessments thus ensure that more consumers are afforded protection under the NCA, 
especially those who have a lower-income.235  
Despite the praise surrounding the affordability assessments, there have been contentions 
that it might not serve low-income, higher risk consumers. These concerns were reflected in 
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the case of Truworths Limited and Others v  Minister of Trade and Industry and Others,236 
which dealt with an application by several large retailers who stated that one of the sub 
regulations of regulation 23A,237 namely sub regulation 4(c) did not adequately cater for this 
portion of society, labelling the sub regulation as ‘discriminatory’ and ‘unreasonable’238 Sub- 
regulation 4(c) provides that when credit providers are conducting an affordability assessment 
on consumers who are self-employed, informally employed, or are employed in a manner by 
which they do not receive payslips or proof of income, they will be obliged to request from 
these consumers, their latest three months bank statements or their latest financial 
statements.239 The applicants contended that as a result of these conditions, the poorer and 
less privileged members of the community who do not have access to bank statements, would 
need to provide a form of validation which is ‘inappropriate’ and ‘impossible’ for them to comply 
with before taking out a loan.240  Engers AJ concurred with the attack of the regulation stating 
it ‘well-founded’,241 and supplemented his submission by using the example of a flower seller 
who does not have a bank account and is therefore unlikely to have bank statements.242 The 
judge further conceded that lacking bank statements creates an ‘insurmountable obstacle’ for 
those who are denied loans of small amount even though they may earn a reasonable monthly 
income.243  
He further reasoned that although the regulations in their entirety promote the prevention of 
reckless credit, they ‘frustrate’ other aims of the NCA, such as the promotion of an accessible 
credit market, particularly to those who historically were unable to access credit, and went on 
to remark that the regulations could have the unintended consequence of eliminating any 
credit being granted to vulnerable consumers, which is in opposition to the aims of the NCA.244 
The regulation was reviewed and ultimately set aside, however, the remaining sub-regulations 
have been left unchanged and credit providers are still required to ask for bank statements or 
pay slips of formally employed consumers when assessing affordability.245  
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37 
 
After concluding a credit agreement, continued protection of the consumer is a priority in terms 
of the NCA. The provisions allowing consumers to acquire statements of their accounts, 
together with details of their loan transactions, play an important role in ensuring that 
consumers are informed about their current financial situation, and that they are dissuaded 
from entering into further credit agreements, overburdening themselves and becoming over-
indebted.246 Again, these provisions are of no benefit to consumers who are financially 
illiterate. 
3.4.4 Correspondence to the aims of the NCA 
The NCA has an array of consumer protective measures which ensure that consumers are 
adequately informed about their credit agreement before, during and after entering into said 
agreement. These provisions not only aim to ensure ‘transparency’ in the credit market, but 
also ensure that consumers are placed in an equal bargaining position to lenders when it 
comes to borrowing money. Further, provisions relating to disclosing the cost of the loan and 
the reckless lending provisions promote the NCA’s objectives in the prevention of over-
indebtedness.247  
However, as predominantly argued by Stoop, the disclosure provisions, whilst making 
substantial information available to the consumer, do not provide for full disclosure.248 This is 
due to the fact that many consumers who obtain information from credit providers, are not able 
to read, comprehend and thus properly utilise such information to their advantage. There are 
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thus curbing reckless lending.  
246 Renke, Roestsoff & Haupt (note 229 above: 256).   
See also National Credit Regulator Annual Report (2017/18) available at 
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247 See National Credit Regulator v Mrs Yilwe NCT-39821-2016-140(1) where the NCT held that the 
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illustrates to credit providers the consequences of failing to adhere to the requirements of the NCA.  
248 Stoop (note 202 above: 11).  
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therefore arguments that in order for these provisions to be fully effective and achieve the aims 
of the NCA, the lack of education amongst consumers needs to be adequately addressed.249 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
There will never exist a piece of legislation that covers every aspect to which it relates. The 
NCA is no different in this regard, and no matter how many safeguards it provides, creditors 
will find ways to exploit recognized loopholes. Provisions relating to the cost of credit, whilst 
practical, appear to have the unintended consequence of reducing access to credit. In 
addition, the NCA’s various ‘gatekeeping’ provisions relating to disclosure and affordability, 
whilst helpful in assessing creditworthiness and avoiding over-indebtedness, prevent 
consumers from accessing credit ‘at the door’ if they fail to meet certain requirements or 























To facilitate an improved perspective of South Africa’s credit legislation and to determine 
whether lessons can be learned from other countries, it is necessary to compare the NCA to 
the credit legislation that currently exist in other developing and developed countries. Due to 
the limited nature of this research, this chapter will only examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of credit legislation in the United Kingdom and India. The research emphasis is 
placed on provisions relating to the cost of credit and disclosure of those costs, as highlighted 
in this dissertation.  
4.2 UNITED KINGDOM 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom has a variety of consumer protection acts and regulations and is 
considered to have one of the most advanced and sophisticated credit markets in the world.250  
4.2.2 Current credit regulatory regime 
Credit in the United Kingdom is regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 39 of 1974 (hereinafter 
the ‘CC Act’) as amended by the Consumer Credit Act 14 of 2006, as well as a number of 
secondary laws.251 The main objectives of the CC Act include, but are not limited to, enabling 
consumers to address unfair lending practices and loan agreements and ensuring improved 
disclosure of information by lenders.252  
In respect of the costs of credit, the United Kingdom has no definitive interest rate cap and 
instead the cost of credit is determined using an annual percentage rate (‘APR’). The APR is 
the complete cost of borrowing for a year and includes loan fees and the interest the consumer 
must pay.253 Although the United Kingdom government had contemplated interest rate caps, 
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term_Credit_Needs_Options_and_Costs_in_the_United_Kingdom_-33652.pdf ,accessed on 16 
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its implementation was considered difficult due to the United Kingdom’s diverse credit market. 
Additionally, it was contended that if lenders were forced to comply with interest rate ceilings, 
it would result in them gravitating towards these ceilings, thus limiting competitive prices for 
consumers, and alternatively, resulting in a loss of profits for lenders and urging them to turn 
away from riskier borrowers.254 
Section 20 of the CC Act provides for the total charge of credit and is arguably one of the most 
important provisions.255 It states that the Secretary of State may make regulations to determine 
the true cost of credit for borrowers and that such regulations will prescribe the items to be 
included in such a cost breakdown as well as how the respective cost amounts are to be 
determined.256  
The regulation also stipulates that the cost breakdown must include the method for calculating 
the rate of the total charge for credit.257 Regulation 4 of the Consumer Credit (Total Charge for 
Credit) Regulations 2010 prescribes how the total cost of credit is to be determined and 
includes account maintenance costs and utilisation costs.258 Regulation 5 provides that the 
APR will be calculated in accordance with a mathematical formula set out in the Schedule, 
and regulation 6 contains a list of assumptions for calculating the APR and the total charge for 
credit.259  
Barclays Bank,260 in England, provides a good example of how the cost of a loan in calculated 
according to this system: if a consumer takes out a loan for a car of €10 000 to pay off over 3 
years, at an APR of 5.5 per cent, this would amount to 36 monthly repayments of 
approximately €301, totalling €10 848.60 (thus amounting to €848.60 in interest and fees).  
The United Kingdom places value on the principle of disclosure, especially in respect of credit 
agreements. Section 55(1) of the CC Act states that regulations may be implemented detailing 
the information to be disclosed and the way it is to be disclosed by a creditor to a borrower 
before he enters into a credit agreement. Regulation 3(2) of the Consumer Credit (Disclosure 
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255 A G Guest & M G Lloyd The Consumer credit act 1974 (1975) 20.  
256 Section 20(1)(a) of the CC Act 39 of 1974. 
257 Ibid, section 20(1)(b). 
258 The Consumer Credit (Total Charge for Credit) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1011 regs 4(1)-4(2), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/1011/pdfs/uksi_20101011_en.pdf, accessed on 
20 September 2018. 
259 Ibid reg 6(a)-(q)).  
260 See Barclays Bank website ‘Personal loan: Want to know your loan rate?’ available at 
https://www.barclays.co.uk/loans/personal/, accessed on 25 September 2018. 
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of Information) Regulations 2010 (the ‘Disclosure Regulations’) provides for pre-contractual 
disclosure and requires the creditor to disclose certain information before the agreement is 
entered into, including but not limited to: the type of credit, the total amount of credit to be 
provided, the duration of the agreement, the interest rate charged, the APR and the total 
amount payable under the agreement, and the amount, number and frequency of 
repayments.261  
In addition, section 60(1)262 allows the Treasury to make regulations regarding the form and 
content of credit agreements to ensure that the borrower is aware of his rights and duties, the 
total charge of credit and the remedies available to him.263 Regulation 8 of the Disclosure 
Regulations specifies the manner of disclosure in credit agreements and states that pre-credit 
information must be disclosed in accordance with the form contained in Schedule 1 which 
contains information such as the features of the credit product and the cost of credit. 264  
The Consumer Credit (EU Directive) Regulations 2010 (the ‘EU Regulations’) amend the CC 
Act by inserting various provisions. Regulation 3, for example, inserts section 55A into the CC 
Act which instructs the creditor to explain various matters to the consumer before agreeing to 
the terms of the loan, to ensure the loan is consistent with his financial ability or needs.265 In 
addition, regulation 5 inserts section 55B into the CC Act which requires the creditor to 
undertake a credit worthiness assessment before extending credit to the consumer.  
In facilitating contractual disclosure, section 63(2) of the CC Act enables the borrower to 
receive a copy of the signed credit agreement within seven days of executing the agreement. 
Further, regulation 3 of The Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 2010 (the ‘Credit 
Agreements Regulations’)266 details the form and content of credit agreements and coincides 
with section 60(1) of the CC Act. It provides that agreements need to include the information 
                                                          
261 The Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1013 reg 4(a)-(v), 
available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/1013/pdfs/uksi_20101013_en.pdf, accessed on 
20 September 2018. 
262 As amended by the Financial Services Act 2012 (Consumer Credit Order) 2013. 
263 Section 60(1) of the CC Act 39 of 1974. 
264 The Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2010 (note 261 above; Schedule 1 
pgs. 10-14).  
265 Such matters include the features of the credit agreement to be included; the periodic payments to 
be paid by the debtor and how the amounts are calculated; any features of the agreement which are 
likely to adversely affect the debtor and which are not likely to be foreseen; the consequences of 
default of payment; and details regarding the right to withdraw from the agreement and the exercise of 
such right. 
266 The Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1014 available at 




specified in Schedule 1 of the Credit Agreements Regulations,267 and states that such 
information must be presented in a ‘clear and concise manner’.268  
Section 97 of the CC Act enables post-contractual disclosure by requiring the creditor, upon 
request by the borrower, to furnish him with a statement indicating the amount payable that is 
necessary to discharge the borrower’s indebtedness, together with particulars indicating how 
that amount is arrived at. Regulation 26 of the EU Regulations inserts section 77B into the CC 
Act which states that upon request by the debtor, the creditor must give him a statement in 
writing which must include a table illustrating the details of the instalments owed under the 
credit agreement.269 
In addition to legislation, financial institutions also have the option of registering with the 
Lending Standards Board and adopting the Standards of Lending Practice,270 which set out 
standards in terms of which credit products, including unsecured loans and overdrafts, are to 
be marketed and sold. This ‘code’ allows firms to govern their relationships with customers in 
a flexible way rather than adhering to rigid rules, and at the same time ensures consumer 
protection and fair lending.271 For instance, one of the aspects of the Standards deals with 
consumer vulnerability, and advises firms to develop loan products and services which are 
inclusive and take into account diverse range of consumers, such as those who are in a 
vulnerable position, and to ensure that such products or services are sufficiently flexible to 
meet the needs of such consumers. 272 
4.2.3 Analysis and comparison 
The United Kingdom possesses various comprehensive credit consumer protection 
provisions, and in this way, identifies with the NCA. In respect of the cost of credit, both the 
CC Act and the Total Charge for Credit Regulations, like the NCA, seek to ensure that the 
consumer is not subject to predatory or unfair lending practices. However, although the 
legislature opted for the APR methodology as opposed to interest rate caps such as the NCA, 
it has been argued by Harding that the objective of protecting consumers in this way has not 
been achieved, as many consumers are still ignorant as to the meaning and importance of the 
                                                          
267 Ibid, Schedule 1 pgs. 7-13. Such information includes but is not limited to: the nature of the 
agreement; duration of the agreement; the amount of credit; the rate of interest; the APR; and the 
time and amount of repayments. 
268 Ibid, regulation 3(2). 
269 These details include the date on which the instalment is due; the amount of the instalment; 
conditions relating to payment of the instalment; and a breakdown of the instalment.  
270 Lending Standards Board ‘The Standards of Lending Practice: Personal Customers’ (2018) 
available at https://www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Standards-of-
Lending-Practice-Personal-7-Dec.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2018 at 2. 
271 Ibid 
272 Ibid 11.  
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APR system.273 Further, it has been contended that creditors have been able to manipulate 
the APR system by extending the term over which the loan is taken.274 Therefore, although 
the APR is reduced, the total interest repayable may have increased.275   
In respect of disclosure, the CC Act and the various regulations discussed above seek to 
ensure that consumers are informed about the different aspects of the credit agreement, at all 
stages of the credit process, to enable them to make informed decisions and to shop around 
for the best prices.276 In this regard, the credit regime is like that of South Africa’s. Whilst these 
efforts are commendable, financial illiteracy still exists in the United Kingdom and many 
consumers are still unaware of various financial charges, rendering it difficult for them to 
compare credit products.277  
Furthermore, it can be contended that after the financial crisis in 2008, and due to more 
stringent credit regulations being introduced, many consumers have been prevented from 
accessing mainstream sources of credit. Statistics emphasise this point by showing that the 
availability of unsecured credit has decreased to consumers due to the tightening of credit 
lending criteria.278  
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The reasoning behind the APR system is relevant to South Africa’s current credit regime. It 
has been argued that the interest rate caps introduced by the NCA and its regulationdhave 
had the effect of excluding competition, as creditors charge the maximum rate, and has 
resulted in many high-risk consumers being denied access to formal finance. The United 
Kingdom deviated from this approach by introducing the APR system to suit its diverse 
market.279 Despite its practical rationale, their consumers still face difficulties in determining 
the true cost of loans due to financial illiteracy.  
Both the APR system utilised in the United Kingdom, and the capping mechanism applied in 
South Africa, address the need for the protection of consumers from exploitive lending 
                                                          
273 G Harding Consumer credit and consumer hire: a practical guide (1996) 64. See also United 
Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (note 253 above; 62) which highlights the difficulties 
consumers face in understanding this method of calculation and subsequently find it trying to compare 
prices for different loan products. 
274 United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (note 253 above; 62). 
275 Ibid 
276 Harding (note 273 above; 61). 
277 United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (note 253 above; 62). 
278 Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey-2018 Q1 (2018) available at 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/credit-conditions-survey/2018/2018-q1, accessed on 10 September 
2018 at 1.  
279 United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (note 253 above: 62). 
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practices. However, despite the sound reasoning behind their implementation, both systems 
have similar effects in that consumers find it difficult to understand the total cost of a loan.  
Further, although the United Kingdom has introduced extensive disclosure provisions which 
aim to ensure transparent lending, financial illiteracy bars consumers from the full extent of 
protection that the legislature aimed at promoting. South African consumers likewise 
experience difficulties in understanding the information disclosed to them, despite the NCA’s 
wide-ranging disclosure requirements.  In addition, while the United Kingdom’s credit regime 
is comprehensive, it can be submitted that its rigorous regulations have excluded many 
consumers from accessing mainstream credit. This same contention can be made in respect 
of South Africa’s stringent credit legislation. 
The Standards of Lending Practice can, perhaps, be argued to be one of the most effective 
solutions aimed at eradicating unfair lending practices, as it acts as a ‘voluntary code’ 
providing guidelines which lenders can follow, without having to strictly adhere to. In this way, 
consumers are protected without necessarily being financially excluded due to their non-
conformity with risk-standards. Lenders who adopt this code can use a ‘flexible discretion’ 
without necessarily being bound to certain ‘gatekeeping provisions’ when extending credit to 
those consumers who are considered high risk by other lenders. 
4.3 INDIA 
4.3.1 Introduction 
India, like South Africa, is still a developing country. This statement is also true in respect of 
India’s credit regime. Traditionally, Indian consumers were ‘debt averse’ and reluctant to 
borrow money except for when it came from family or friends.280 Today, however, credit is no 
longer seen as taboo and can be obtained with relative ease from banks, non-banking financial 
                                                          
280 ‘Despite a booming economy, is India’s credit market slowing down?’ Knowledge @ Wharton 6 
September 2007 available at knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/despite-a-booming-economy-is-
indias-consumer-credit-market-slowing-down/#, accessed on 20 September 2018.  
45 
 
institutions or peer-to-peer lending platforms online.281 India’s credit legislation is however, 
anything but simple.282  
4.3.2 Current credit regulatory regime 
Credit in India is regulated by a variety of laws and regulations but lacks a single, 
comprehensive piece of credit legislation. Instead, different aspects of credit are governed by 
several different laws.  
With regards to the cost of credit, it is necessary to note that over the years, interest rates on 
loans have been largely deregulated,283 and banks were free to determine lending rates for 
different products, subject to approval of the Managing Committee and the requirement of 
transparency.284 Although interest rates have been deregulated, rates beyond a certain level 
can be deemed excessive,285 and the boards of banks are required to adopt and adhere to 
principles according to guidelines published by the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’). These 
guidelines include the requirement that interest rates charged by banks must be considered 
reasonable and justified, considering the prospective risk of the borrower and the presence or 
absence of collateral. Further, banks need to consider the total cost of credit to the borrower, 
including interest rates and charges, which must be justifiable. In addition, the guidelines 
provide that an appropriate ceiling on the interest rate may be publicised.286 The RBI has also 
sought to limit predatory lending practices by warning banks to desist from ‘pernicious 
                                                          
281 ‘Waiting for a crisis?’ Business Today 11 September 2016, available at 
https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/features/unsecured-credit-has-made-a-comeback-but-with-
risks/story/236367.html, accessed on 20 September 2018.  
See also Reserve Bank of India Consultation Paper Peer to Peer Lending (2016) available at 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/cperr280416.pdf, accessed on 20 November 2018 at 4: 
Peer-to-peer lending (P2P Lending) can be defined as the use of an online platform which seeks to 
match lenders, who provide unsecured loans, with borrowers. The interest rate on such loans is either 
agreed upon by the parties or is a flat rate set by the platform. See page 7 for various advantages of 
P2P lending for borrowers, such as lower rates offered by lenders as opposed to other moneylenders 
from unorganised financial sectors.  
282 For a history of India’s credit market, see: M Shah, R Rao & P.S.V Shankar ‘Rural Credit in 20th 
Century India: Overview of History and Perspectives’ (2007) 42(15) JSTOR available at 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4419471?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, accessed on 15 September 
2018 at 1351-1360. 
283 P Basu ‘A Financial System for India’s Poor’ (2005) 40(37) JSTOR available at 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4417132?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, accessed on 15 September 
2018 at 4008. 
284 Complaints about excessive interest charged by banks, RBI Notification No. RBI /2006-2007/377 
(07/05/2007), available at https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/77163.PDF, accessed on 
14 September 2018 at para 2. 
285 Ibid para 3. 
286 Ibid para 4. 
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practices,’ which include camouflaging the interest element in the form of a processing fee, 
with the RBI stating that such practices violate the principle of fair and transparent lending.287  
The lending rate for credit is now determined under a relatively new methodology implemented 
by the RBI, known as the Marginal Cost of Funds based Lending Rate (‘MCLR’).288 According 
to the RBI, commercial banks are required to prepare MCLR which acts as the ‘internal 
benchmark’ for lending rates and which requires that interest rates for different customers 
differ depending on the level of risk of the borrower.  
This means that the cost of loans will differ from bank to bank. For example, a personal loan 
(such an unsecured loan) under Rs.10 lakhs289 from Punjab National Bank will accrue an 
interest rate of MCLR (currently 8,45%) +3.55%.290 This rate can be contrasted to a loan for a 
car which is MCLR+0.95%.291 The interest rate for a personal loan is higher due to the fact 
that the loan is unsecured, whereas the loan for the car attracts a lower interest rate because 
there is security.  
It should be noted that P2P lending (where an online platform is utilised to provide unsecured 
loans)292 is gaining momentum in India and is attractive to borrowers as lenders offer lower 
interest rates and other charges, when compared to banks.293 Usually, the online platform is 
provided by a technology company registered under the Companies Act,294 and allows lenders 
to participate in the lending process once they are registered on the website.295 Once the 
borrower registers on the site, the online platform regulates the transaction and enables the 
                                                          
287 Pernicious practices of select banks deterring customer protection and accounting integrity, RBI 
Notification No. RBI/2013-14/292 (17/09/2013), available at 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/CS172509113FS.pdf, accessed on 14 September 
2018 at para 3.  
288 Previously, banks had to determine their lending rate based on the Base Rate which was the 
minimum rate at which a bank could lend. If the Base Rate was, for example, 10%-10.25%, banks 
could select a rate between these 2 figures and then add a percentage point to that.  
289 The currency of India is the Indian Rupee (Rs). A Lakh Rupee is 100 000 rupees. As of 28 
September 2018, according to the exchange rate, Rs. 10 lack would equate to approximately 
R19 951.00 (See the ‘Currency Converter’ available at https://coinmill.com/INR_ZAR.html)  
290 See Punjab National Bank website ‘Interest Rates on Advances-Linked with MCLR’ available at 
https://www.pnbindia.in/interst-rate-on-advances-linked-to-mclr.html, accessed on 19 September 
2018.   
291 Ibid. See also Axis Bank website ‘Personal loan interest rate’ available at 
https://www.axisbank.com/retail/loans/personal-loan/interest-rates-charges, accessed on 19 
September 2018 which shows Axis Bank providing a different rate for a personal loan, being  
292 Reserve Bank of India Consultation Paper (note 281 above; 4): Peer-to-peer lending (P2P lending) 
can be defined as the use of an online platform which seeks to match lenders, who provide unsecured 
loans, with borrower (see note 280 above which provides a comprehensive definition of P2P lending). 
The interest rate on such loans is either agreed upon by the parties or is a flat rate set by the platform.  
293 Ibid 7. 
294 Act No. 18 of 2013 
295 Reserve Bank of India Consultation Paper (note 280 above; 7). 
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lender to transfer the loan from his bank account to the borrower’s account.296 P2P lending 
therefore allows for relatively simple and speedy access to unsecured credit.  
Disclosure plays an equally important role in the credit context within India. Previously, India 
had no ‘truth-in-lending laws’ which required lenders to make truthful disclosures of interest 
rates and to refrain from misleading borrowers.297 Today, however, there exist a variety of laws 
designed to promote consumer access to information. The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
1986 (‘the Consumer Protection Act’) was implemented to provide better protection for 
consumer interests,298 and to establish consumer councils. The Consumer Protection Act 
makes provision for a Central Consumer Protection Council,299 whose objects include 
promoting the rights of interests of consumers300 such as the right to be informed about the 
‘quality’, ‘quantity’ and ‘price’ of goods or services.301  
In 2007, the RBI issued guidelines to be considered by banks which included the requirement 
of a ‘prior-approval process’ for loan applicants with reference to factors such as the cash 
flows of the prospective borrower.302 This guideline facilitates pre-contractual disclosure by 
both the bank and the borrower in order to prevent the consumer from borrowing more than 
he can afford. In 2008, the RBI added to this by instructing banks to ensure that all loan 
application forms contained cost information that was comprehensive and included all terms 
relating to fees and charges.303 Further, banks were instructed to provide the consumer with 
an ‘all in cost’ of the loan to aid him in comparing the prices of different financial products,304 
                                                          
296 Ibid. 
297 U Varottil ‘Truth in lending: Regulatory Measures in India’ India Corp Law, 10 February 2015 
available at https://indiacorplaw.in/2015/02/truth-in-lending-regulatory-measures-in.html, accessed on 
20 September 2018. In the past, lenders merely had to disclose a ‘flat rate of interest’ which usually 
only amounted to half the actual interest rate. 
298 It should be noted that in terms of Section 2(d)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, ‘consumer’ 
includes a person who ‘buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly 
paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such 
goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or 
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval 
of such person..’ This section therefore makes provision for a consumer of credit. 
299 Section 4 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 1986. 
300 Section 6 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 1986. 
301 It should be noted that ‘service’ in terms of Section 2(o) of the Consumer Protection Act includes a 
service relating to banking or financing, thus making the Consumer Protection Act applicable to the 
practice of obtaining loans. 
302 RBI Notification No. RBI /2006-2007/377 (07/05/2007) (note 284 above: 4).  
303 Disclosing all information relating to processing fees/charges, RBI Notification No. RBI/2008-
09/328 (25/11/2008), available at https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/89293.PDF, 




and in this way ensured that all fees were disclosed to consumers to avoid banks getting away 
with ‘unfair trade practices’.305  
To emphasise this point, the RBI issued another notification in 2010 which instructed banks to 
transparently disclose all information about fees, charges, their respective amounts, penalty 
fees and the existence of an interest clause,306 and further, that such information had to be 
displayed on the bank’s website.307 This was reiterated in a further notification in 2015 which 
requested banks to adhere to various instructions relating to information to be displayed on 
their websites, including the interest rate for different loans; the fees and charges relating to 
each; and the APR to represent the total cost of credit, thereby allowing consumers to compare 
the prices of different loans and to facilitate transparency when concluding the loan 
agreement.308 
The RBI aims to ensure consumers are adequately protected at both the processing stage of 
the loan and thereafter, by instructing banks to provide borrowers with a ‘key fact statement’ 
which includes, amongst other things, the name of the loan product, its amount, the interest 
and fees payable and the number of instalments payable.309 In addition, the Guidelines on Fair 
Practices Code for Lenders, which was issued by the RBI in 2003,310 has been adopted by the 
majority of financial institutions in India and contains rules relating to loan applications. For 
example, lenders are required to ensure a proper assessment of the loan application is 
undertaken before the loan is granted,311 and further, are to confirm that the terms and 
conditions of the agreement have been accepted by the borrower and reduced to writing and 
signed.312  
                                                          
305 An ‘unfair trade practice’ is defined in Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act and means a 
deceptive method or practice in the sale or supply of any goods or provision of any services, and 
includes but is not limited to: a false representation relating to the standard or quality of a good or 
service; a misrepresentation regarding the need for or usefulness of a particular good or service; or 
materially misleading the public as to the price of the good or service. Such unfair practices can 
therefore also be attributed to misrepresenting the true cost or terms of a loan agreement.  
306 RBI Notification No. RBI/2010-11/285 (19/11/2010) (note 303 above; para 2).  
307 Ibid 
308 Display of information by banks, RBI Notification No. RBI/2014-15/422 (22/01/2015) available at 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/C64DIB22012015.PDF, accessed on 14 September 
2018 at para 2(a)(i)-(iii).   
309 Ibid at para 2(b). For an example of such a ‘summary box’, see the Annexure attached to this 
Circular. 
310 Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Lenders, RBI Notification No. 104/09.07.007/2002-03 
(05/05/2003) available at https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/36102.PDF, accessed on 
14 September 2018.  
311 Ibid at para 2(ii)(a). 
312 Ibid at para 2(ii)(c). 
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The RBI provides an example regarding the cost of a loan which banks are required to include 
in their websites:313  
Example of EMI Calculation (pure fixed loan)314 
  Amount of Loan 1,000,000.00   
  Annual Interest Rate 15.00%   
  Number of Payments 120   
  Monthly Payment 16,133.50   
 
In this way, India’s credit regime ensures consumers are aware of their obligations which are 
not hidden beneath a mass of words or terminology. 
Post-contractual disclosure is ensured by requiring lenders to provide a copy of the loan 
agreement to the borrower once the agreement is concluded, and to provide notice of any 
alterations to the terms, conditions and interest rate of the agreement.315  
 4.3.3 Analysis and comparison 
Although India, like the United Kingdom, has removed their caps on charges such as interest 
rates, there still exist various protective mechanisms in place to prevent consumers from being 
charged exorbitant fees on their loans. The MCLR system ensures that there is still a 
structured device upon which banks can set their lending rates. Further, the various 
notifications implemented by the RBI have sought to protect consumers from excessive rates 
on their loans, thus preventing reckless lending and over-indebtedness.   
The RBI has also introduced various guidelines and instructions to ensure transparency in 
loan agreements, and like both the United Kingdom and South Africa, makes provision for pre-
contractual disclosure, contractual disclosure, and post-contractual disclosure. To prevent 
over-indebtedness, banks are also instructed to undertake credit-worthiness assessments, 
similar to the affordability assessment provided for by the NCA.  
4.3.4 Conclusion 
India possesses a variety of consumer protective devices which place significant emphasis on 
the cost of loans and disclosure to consumers. There is, however, a lack of a single, 
comprehensive piece of credit legislation that can aid consumers in understanding their rights, 
                                                          
313 Reserve Bank of India Frequently Asked Questions Annex, available at 
https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=77, accessed on 21 November 2018 
314 EMI stands for ‘Equated Monthly Instalments’ which includes repayment of both the principal 
amount and the interest. 
315 RBI Notification No. 104/09.07.007/2002-03 (05/05/2003) (note 310 above; at para 2(iii)). 
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remedies and duties. Interestingly, despite this lack of stringent legislative authority, the 
availability of unsecured loans has risen by approximately 27 per cent from 2015 to 2018,316 
suggesting that consumers have improved access to credit. 
Furthermore, peer-to-peer lending creates a safe and regulated alternative for consumers who 
cannot access formal finance or who are denied loans by formal credit providers, allowing 
them to obtain loans without resorting to unregulated sources. This ‘middle ground’ promotes 
access to credit and may address any limitations faced by lenders and borrowers.317 In 
addition, the use of an online platform and registration of users simplifies the distribution of 
information between parties to the loan agreement, thereby facilitating proper disclosure.318  
4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above information, different countries have difference mechanisms in place 
regarding the cost of credit and the disclosure of information relating to credit.  
The United Kingdom can be compared to South Africa in its structured approach to credit 
legislation and consumer protection, however, unlike South Africa, it is able to afford effective 
enforcement of these regulations.  
Furthermore, the United Kingdom, despite having a comprehensive piece of legislation which 
deals with credit as well as various other regulations and codes which aim at protecting 
consumers, still experiences many difficulties which undermine these objectives. For example, 
while the United Kingdom has a clear and concise mechanism for calculating interest, many 
consumers are continuously perplexed as to the total cost of credit. Similarly, the positive 
impact of the various disclosure provisions is limited due to the financial illiteracy of 
consumers. 
It can be concluded, based on the analysis of the United Kingdom’s regulatory framework and 
the statistics outlined above, that even though consumer protection in relation to credit is 
extensive, it may be hampering access to credit as lenders are denying those consumers who 
they consider higher risk.  
India’s history and consumer culture can be compared to that of South Africa’s. However, 
despite having an array of consumer protection mechanisms in place relating to cost and 
                                                          
316 CRISIL (Press Release) Unsecured loans grow 4x bank credit, ride to continue (2018) available at 
https://www.crisil.com/en/home/newsroom/press-releases/2018/07/unsecured-loans-grow-4x-bank-
credit-ride-to-continue.html, accessed on 22 September 2018.   
317 S.S. Lavanga-Slater Investigating Peer-to-Peer Lending as a Solution to Unsecured Lending in an 
Unbalanced Credit Market (unpublished PhD study, University of Pretoria, 2017) available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/60502/Lavagna_Investigating_2017.pdf?sequence=
1, accessed on 1 December 2018 at 52. 
318 Ibid 100. 
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disclosure of credit, India seems to lack a single and comprehensive piece of legislation 
dealing with consumer credit and protection. Its credit system, as opposed to the United 
Kingdom and South Africa, is complicated and consists of several Acts, Regulations, 
Notifications and Circulars. Interestingly however, statistics show that the availability of and 
access to unsecured credit in India has increased. Yet the United Kingdom, due to stringent 
lending criteria has seen a decrease in access to this form of credit.   
This suggests that when it comes to credit legislation and credit access there is no one size 
fits all approach. There are pros and cons to each form of legislative regime. It can be 
contended that one regime is not necessarily best suited to a country but could be better suited 
to another country.  
South Africa can be described as the ‘middle ground’ between the United Kingdom and India 
as, despite having credit legislation similar to that of the United Kingdom, it still faces difficulties 
when it comes to consumers’ access to credit. This lack of access is, however, somewhat 
negated by the extensive consumer protection mechanisms contained in the NCA, such as 
those provided for in India’s legislation, which ensure that consumers do not fall victim to 
reckless lending and over-indebtedness. A balance therefore needs to be found between 
improving access to credit and simultaneously ensuring consumers are shielded from 
exploitation by lenders.  
It can be suggested that voluntary codes, such as those implemented in both the United 
Kingdom and India, be adopted by lenders in South Africa. These codes provide standards to 
which lenders can voluntarily adhere to (thus improving their public image) and which do not 
hamper their productivity and profits. This, in turn, can facilitate improved access to credit 
whilst ensuring consumers are protected.  
In addition, P2P lending can be contended to be a feasible alternative to formal sources of 
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This research paper has demonstrated instances where, despite the sound reasoning and 
practicality behind the provisions of the NCA and its regulations, the NCA’s objectives relating 
to access to credit and improved consumer information are not being met. 
To determine the precise impact of the regulation of unsecured credit on consumers, this 
chapter seeks to answer the various sub-questions raised in the beginning of this paper.  
5.2. DOES THE REGULATION PERTAINING TO UNSECURED CREDIT IMPROVE 
FINANCIAL ACCESSIBILITY IN THE MARKET IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIMS 
PROVIDED FOR IN THE NCA? 
One of the aims of the NCA, as referenced in its preamble and section 3, is to improve 
accessibility of credit, especially to those who were previously denied access to credit. The 
NCA has achieved this objective in part by removing the exemption that had restricted the 
unsecured credit market,320 and introduced measures to safeguard consumers, such as 
maximum rates of interest and cost caps.321 However, following the reckless and predatory 
lending allegations surrounding the Marikana Massacre, the lending criteria of unsecured 
credit was made more prescriptive and stringent and in so doing had the effect of unsecured 
loans only being granted to higher-income consumers.322 
This was echoed in the case of Truworths Limited and Others v Minister of Trade and Industry 
and Others,323 where it was argued that measures such as the affordability assessment 
introduced by the NCA had the unintended consequence of reducing access to credit. The 
case of Micro Finance South Africa v Minister of Trade and Industry and Another324 also 
illustrated concerns that the stringent criteria contained in the NCA meant that lenders were 
reluctant to lend to lower-income, higher risk consumers.  
The measures introduced by the NCA pertaining to the cost of credit on unsecured loans have 
had the unintended consequence of reducing access to credit. The initiation fee (alleged by 
Campbell to be an unnecessary cost),325 promotes consumer over-indebtedness, as 
consumers who cannot afford the initiation fee upfront, are lured into taking another loan to 
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cover the cost.326 Furthermore, the ‘flat-rate’ attached to the service fee (which fails to 
distinguish between financially active consumers and consumers who do not use their 
accounts often),327 results in smaller loans attracting inflated rates.328 
In addition, the interest rate on loans, including unsecured loans, are considered ‘prescribed’ 
rates rather than maximum rates as intended by the legislature,329 and result in consumers 
being denied access to credit at competitive prices.330 Further, these caps mean that lenders, 
who are seeking to attain high profits, would prefer to lend to higher income consumers who 
pose little to no risk.331 
Upon examination of these charges, it can be submitted that smaller, unsecured loans which 
are required by many lower-income consumers, are simply not affordable to lower-income 
consumers, consequently excluding many consumers from accessing credit. These 
contentions have merit. Statistics provided by the CCMR, as illustrated earlier in this paper, 
show that lenders favour granting unsecured loans to consumers who earn more than R15 000 
per month, and tend to reject applicants who earn less than R10 000 per month.332 
Therefore, although the regulations introduced pertaining to unsecured credit were aimed at 
minimising exploitation and improving access to credit, these objectives are not being met and 
lower-income consumers (whose welfare the NCA directly aims to improve) are being 
financially excluded from the unsecured credit market, and alternatively, the formal credit 
market. 
5.3 WHAT ADVANTAGES DO THE NCA AND ITS REGULATIONS POSSESS FOR 
CONSUMERS? 
The NCA has been described as a ‘huge improvement’ to its predecessors due its increased 
breadth of application and its ability to regulate various forms of credit.333 One of these forms 
of credit is unsecured credit which acts as a staple for many consumers in South Africa, 
particularly those who rely on it to accommodate their living expenses from day to day. 
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Despite its pitfalls pertaining to the costs of unsecured loans, the rationale behind the caps on 
costs for loans is sound in that they aim to prevent the exploitation of consumers whilst 
enabling lenders to profit.334 Further, mechanisms such as the ‘in duplum’ rule ensure that the 
costs on defaulting loans are capped, preventing consumers from falling into debt spirals.335 
The NCA also instructs both the NCR and the Minister to consult with each other and with 
industry experts and participants (such as credit providers and debt counsellors) when 
reviewing these limits before implementing them. During these consultations, various factors 
are considered, such as access to credit and the potential impact of the regulations.336 In this 
way, the NCA seeks to ensure the lived-reality of society and the needs of consumers are 
considered.  
The disclosure provisions contained in the NCA and its regulations (such as the delivery of 
quotations) enable consumers to get the most economically viable credit and ensure they are 
aware of terms and conditions before entering into a loan agreement.337  
Further, safeguards in the NCA such as the reckless lending provisions aim to prevent 
consumers from being exploited even if they are unable to understand these terms.338 For 
example, section 89 of the NCA which details circumstances whereby a credit agreement will 
be considered unlawful,339 and section 90 which provides for unlawful provisions of a credit 
agreement.340  
Overall, the disclosure provisions, as detailed previously in this paper, act as an inherent 
defence for consumers by dissuading them from taking out loans which they cannot afford. 341 
Therefore, the NCA, through these structural and systematic mechanisms, does achieve its 
objectives in creating a transparent and responsible credit market, whilst ensuring responsible 
borrowing and informed decision-making by consumers. In this way, consumers are 
advantaged by the NCA and its regulations.  
5.4 TO WHAT EXTENT ARE CONSUMERS OVER-BURDENED BY THE CURRENT 
LEGISLATION? 
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One of the fundamental issues pertaining to the NCA and consumers is that due to the 
stringent criteria imposed, lower-income consumers who are considered high risk by lenders, 
are denied access to secure forms of finance. This means that lower-income consumers are 
forced to utilise unsecured loans which, as illustrated in this paper, are more expensive 
compared to secure loans.342  
Alternatively, these consumers are altogether excluded from the formal credit market and are 
compelled to source unregulated sources of finance, such as loans through usurers,343 which 
subjects them to exploitation.344  These issues are illustrated through the CCMR statistics 
highlighted above, which show a gradual exclusion of lower-income consumers from the 
formal credit market.345  
Further, the price structure relating to unsecured loans, such as the initiation fee, service fee 
and interest, make smaller loans (on which many lower-income consumers rely) more 
expensive. Despite not appearing so, consumers are charged beyond the actual cost of the 
loan itself.346 In addition, due to the maximum rates of interest being treated as prescribed 
rates by lenders, consumers are denied loans at competitive prices,347 preventing them from 
achieving economic advancement.  
Another important issue is that of financial illiteracy of consumers. Despite the regulations 
pertaining to disclosure of information and transparency, many consumers are still unable to 
fully comprehend and utilise the information that is provided, rendering these provisions 
futile.348 Accordingly, even with mandatory disclosure of terms and costs, consumers still tend 
to choose those loans which are more expensive due to the way information is presented by 
lenders, therefore facilitating exploitation by lenders.349 
5.5 IS THERE A SATISFACTORY BALANCE BETWEEN CONSUMER PROTECTION AND 
ACCESS TO CREDIT IMPOSED BY THE NCA AND ITS REGULATIONS? 
The NCA was implemented due to a history of abuse by credit lenders,350 in a market which 
was characterised by inequality, an absence of transparency and inadequate consumer 
protections.351 In response, the legislature introduced various measures to shield consumers 
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from exploitive practices including the establishment of the NCR which seeks to provide 
consumers with a system of redress.352 In addition, the reckless lending provisions contained 
in the NCA serve as a ‘red line’353 for lenders’ conduct and ensure consumers are not severely 
disadvantaged through hindrances such as illiteracy. The introduction of caps on the cost of 
loans similarly seek to curb reckless lending.  
However, it is submitted that the NCA’s efforts to safeguard consumers may have resulted in 
stringent provisions which force consumers, who are considered high-risk, towards alternative 
and costlier sources of credit.354 This submission is illustrated by statistics published by the 
NCR which show that, in an attempt to facilitate access to credit, the NCA has unintentionally 
contributed towards financial exclusion,355 and in so doing, has favoured credit expansion over 
consumer protection. 356 
Therefore, although the NCA has tried to simultaneously ensure a transparent and responsible 
credit market whilst improving access to credit, it can be argued that its intensive efforts to 
protect consumers has, in fact, resulted in many consumers being forced to take out 
unsecured loans which are more expensive than secured loans, or alternatively being 
excluded from the formal credit market altogether. Consequently, consumers are exploited by 
unregulated lenders such as usurers,357 or forced to pay more for small loans, and in this way, 
are not fully protected as the NCA intended.  
5.6 IS MORE, OR LESS REGULATION NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT STATE OF 
AFFAIRS? 
Based on South Africa’s history of consumer abuse, the complexity of the credit market,358 
and the need for transparent lending and enforcement mechanisms, credit needs to be 
regulated.359 However, there exists a risk, in any regulated market, that too much regulation 
could result in costs being passed to the consumer,360 and access to credit being hampered. 
361 
The United Kingdom’s credit legislation identifies with the NCA on several aspects, but 
particularly because it consists of a single, comprehensive statute which deals with consumer 
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credit and has extensive consumer protection mechanisms. To negate the effects of stringent 
legislation on access to credit, the United Kingdom introduced the APR method to determine 
the cost of credit, as opposed to cost caps. However, it has been contended that this method 
is still being manipulated by creditors and that consumers do not fully comprehend its 
calculation, thus making it difficult to compare prices of loans.362 Furthermore, despite its 
comprehensive credit provisions, statistics show that many consumers are being denied 
access to mainstream finance and the availability of unsecured loans has decreased.363  
India, in contrast to the United Kingdom and South Africa, has a variety of legislative devices 
dealing with consumer credit as opposed to a single, stringent statute. In addition, the cost of 
credit is not capped but structured lending mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency 
and affordability. Despite the complex, more lenient legislative framework, statistics show that 
the availability of unsecured loans has increased by 27 per cent.364  
Consequently, it can be contended that both legislative approaches have their flaws and 
strengths. A less rigid legislative framework such as India’s will have the drawback of weaker 
consumer protection but will have an increased access to credit. Alternatively, a stringent 
legislative framework such as the United Kingdom’s will have the shortfall of reduced access 
to credit but will have increased consumer protection. 
To conclude, each country is varied in respect of its consumers, resources and capital, 
therefore, the selected credit legislation should best suit that country’s needs. In other words, 
one size cannot fit all.  
5.7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both lenient and rigorous criteria, therefore a 
balance needs to be found between consumer protection and access to credit. It is submitted 
that the NCA can learn some valuable lessons from the contrasting credit frameworks of the 
United Kingdom and India. For example, both the United Kingdom and India have voluntary 
codes with flexible criteria,365 allowing lenders to escape the rigidity of formal credit legislation 
whilst simultaneously ensuring consumer protection and access to credit. In addition, these 
voluntary codes enable lenders to accommodate the needs and circumstances of individual 
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consumers and situations.366 Consequently, borrowers are not instantly refused credit should 
they need meet certain gatekeeping criteria. 
Furthermore, P2P lending can act as a ‘middle ground’ by allowing consumers to access 
unsecured credit without necessarily facing the same gatekeeping provisions implemented by 
the NCA and its regulations. Additionally, consumers, upon rejection by formal lenders, will 
have another viable alternative to attaining unsecured credit without resorting to unregulated 
sources of finance.  
5.8 CONCLUSION 
After an analysis of the various provisions relating to unsecured credit, it can be contended 
that the NCA and its regulations have both a positive and negative impact on consumers. The 
NCA has facilitated consumer protection by curbing exploitive lending practices and promoting 
a transparent credit market which ensures consumers are able to make informed choices. 
In addition, the NCA and its regulations have introduced provisions relating to the cost of credit 
which seek to safeguard consumers from becoming over-indebted by taking out loans which 
they cannot afford, and further, seek to ensure the costs of credit are not excessive. 
On the surface, the NCA is practical, its reasoning is sound, and its objectives are well-
intentioned. However, strict lending criteria pertaining to unsecured credit has had the 
unintended consequence of reducing access to credit, especially to lower-income consumers, 
whom the NCA aims to support. In this way, Kelly-Louw’s portrayal of regulation being 
portrayed as a ‘toothless tiger’ appears correct.367  
Regulation of credit, including unsecured credit, is needed in South Africa based on its history. 
Furthermore, regulation of credit is essential for credit providers to alleviate the risks they 
undertake when providing loans to consumers. However, the negative impact of such 
regulation on consumers’ needs to be considered. Once we have appreciated the practical 
impact that such legislation has, methods of alleviating the harsh unintended consequences 
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